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In recent years the number of civil suits filed in federal court under
42 U.S.C. § 19831 alleging police misconduct 2 has increased dramat-
ically.3 Section 1983 grants a private right of action to redress viola-
tions of constitutional rights committed by a person acting under color
of state law. Although there are, in theory, other ways of controlling
police misconduct,4 the popularity of section 1983 suits suggests that
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1. The statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), a portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
2. The term "police misconduct" is used to describe all police behavior alleged to
violate a citizen's constitutional rights with the exception of wiretapping. Wiretapping
is excluded because, unlike other types of police misconduct, it is controlled by federal
legislation, which includes a specific statute that establishes a separate civil action for
victims of illegal wiretaps. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1976). The inclusion of wiretapping suits
would have added two suits to the number of § 1983 suits in the Project sample. See
p. 786 infra.
3. Suits against police officers brought under the civil rights statutes have increased
from 2,000 in 1971 to over 6,000 in 1977. Police: Under Fire, Fighting Back, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REPORT, Apr. 3, 1978, at 39 [hereinafter cited as Under Fire]; cf. Shook, Police and
the Law, POLICE CHIEF, May 1978, at 8 (suits increased 400% in five-year period ending
early 1970s). Civil rights actions in general have increased from 287 in 1960 to 13,113 in
1977. Compare [1960] AD. OFF. U.S. CTs. ANN. REP. 232 with [1977] AD. OFF. U.S. CTS.
ANN. REP. 318. This increase is due partially to the expansion of police misconduct litiga-
tion. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage
Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 452 nn.19-21 (1978).
4. Other legal mechanisms for controlling police misconduct include (1) the exclu-
sionary rule, (2) actions by the internal affairs office of the police department, (3) criminal
sanctions, and (4) suits at common law. Of these, only the last resembles § 1983 in that
it compensates the victim for his injury.
The exclusionary rule was designed to remove one incentive for misconduct by barring
the use of illegally obtained evidence, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961), but the
deterrent effect of the rule is strongly disputed. Compare Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary
Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 709, 755-56 (1970) (deterrent effect
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they are perceived by the aggrieved individuals as the most effective
means of obtaining relief. Nevertheless, serious doubts exist about the
efficacy of section 1983 suits against the police. 5
To be effective, such suits depend upon a hearing before an im-
partial body with the power to enforce meaningful sanctions against
the offending party. This Project0 uses field research to provide sup-
questionable based on empirical research; argument for abolishing rule) and Spiotto,
The Search and Seizure Problem-Two Approaches: The Canadian Tort Remedy and the
U.S. Exclusionary Rule, I J. POLICE SCI. & AD. 36, 49 (1973) (deterrent effect not demon-
strated by empirical study) with Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some
New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681, 725-26 (1974)
(rule fulfills its purpose). By its own terms the exclusionary rule does not operate unless
the police misconduct occurs during the collection of evidence relating to a criminal
prosecution, the defendant is prosecuted, and there is some relevant, illegally obtained
evidence to suppress. Oaks, supra, at 720-21.
The internal affairs division of a police department, which processes civilian com-
plaints against officers, can also act to control police misconduct. The objectivity of these
divisions, however, has been questioned. Id. at 674; Fetherling & Levett, The Paradox of
Policemen Policing Policemen, L.A. Times, Dec. 18, 1977, pt. 8, at 9, col. 1. Some writers
maintain that internal affairs divisions may be more concerned with minor police infrac-
tions that mar the image of the department than with violations of citizens' constitutional
rights. Id.
In theory, police misconduct is deterred also by the possibility that an officer may be
prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976), which imposes criminal sanctions for misconduct
analogous to that proscribed in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). The standard of proof required
in a criminal prosecution, however, is more exacting than that used in civil trials: the
jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct occurred and
that the defendant specifically intended to deny the victim's constitutional rights. Screws
v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 104 (1945) (plurality opinion); cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 187 (1961), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978) (specific intent not required for civil liability). Although a particular state may
have its own relevant criminal statute, both state and federal criminal provisions are
enforced by the district attorney or the United States Attorney. But government prosecu-
tors, who rely on police departments to make arrests and to gather evidence, are reluctant
to prosecute officers. Newman, supra note 3, at 449-50; Schwartz, Complaints Against
the Police: Experience of the Community Rights Division of the Philadelphia District
Attorney's Office, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1023, 1024-25 (1970).
Finally, police misconduct may be redressed by a suit in state court for such common
law torts as false arrest, assault and battery, and trespass. Nevertheless, most police
misconduct suits have been brought in federal court under § 1983 for the following
reasons: federal judges are more familiar with claims involving civil rights; federal judges
are less sensitive to local political pressures; federal discovery rules are more liberal; and
backlogs on federal court dockets are shorter in some jurisdictions. NATIONAL LAwYERS
GUILD, POLICE MISCONDUCT LITIGATION MANUAL 27 (M. Avery & D. Rudovsky eds. 1978).
5. See Hundt, Suing Municipalities Directly Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 70
Nw. U.L. REV. 770 (1975) (remedy flawed by jury bias, inappropriate defenses, lack of
municipal liability, difficulty of obtaining injunctive relief); Newman, supra note 3, at
453 (section 1983 suit is "brought by the wrong plaintiff against the wrong defendant,
subject to the wrong defenses, litigated under the wrong burden of proof, and rewarded
if successful with the wrong measure of damages"); Note, Damage Remedies Against
Municipalities for Constitutional Violations, 89 HARV. L. REv. 922 (1976) (municipal
liability necessary to fulfill goals of compensation and deterrence).
6. The "Project" is a research study of some of the § 1983 suits brought against the
police in Connecticut between 1970 and 1977. It is not, however, intended to be a well-
controlled social scientific experiment. The absence of control groups, a randomly selected
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port for the following propositions: (1) juries, the critical decision-
making bodies in section 1983 suits, are not impartial because many
jurors disfavor plaintiffs and favor police defendants in these suits;
and (2) adverse verdicts have minimal effect on defendants because
police departments and police officers are insulated from the con-
sequences of the suits.
Jury bias is a critical issue in evaluating the efficacy of the section
1983 action. Jury verdicts not only determine liability of individual
defendants, but also establish the standards against which all police
misconduct claims are measured.7 The possibility that jury bias could
frustrate the protection of civil rights was acknowledged as early as the
debate over the passage of section 1983.8 Recent commentators on
police misconduct litigation, moreover, theorize that plaintiffs usually
have less jury appeal than police defendants. 9
The Project focused its research on several factors thought likely to
contribute to jury bias. A defendant policeman in a section 1983
action may benefit from the image of authority and respectability
evoked by his office,' 0 and the good faith defense" may reinforce biases
sample, and a large sample size limit the statistical tests applicable to the data. Rather,
the Project was conceived as an exploratory study, and due attention was given to the
need for flexibility as issues of importance became obvious from initial research. To the
extent possible in such a study, social scientific procedures were employed to increase
the accuracy, reliability, and usefulness of the data. See note 33 infra. This was particu-
larly true during the construction of the various questionnaires and interview schedules.
7. See ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED
STATES, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 18-19 (1977) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN JURY
Sysmm]; Levett & Fetherling, Prosecuting a Police Officer Is Fighting City Hall, L.A.
Times, Dec. 18, 1977, pt. 8, at 12, cols. 3-4.
8. In debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Congressman Hoar of Massachusetts
stated:
If the jurors of South Carolina constantly and as a rule refuse to do justice between
man and man where the rights of a particular class of its citizens are concerned, and
that State affords by its legislation no remedy, that is as much a denial to that class
of citizens of the equal protection of the laws as if the State itself put on its statute-
book a statute enacting that no verdict should be rendered in the courts of that State
in favor of this class of citizens.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 334 (1871), cited in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 177
(1961), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
9. Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV.
493, 501 (1955); Newman, supra note 3, at 454, 456. Contra, Comment, Monetary Claims
Under Section 1983: The Right to Trial by Jury, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 613, 627
(1973) (juries capable of rendering fair verdicts in civil rights trials).
10. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 421-22 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). Several writers have noted that juries favor policemen in criminal prosecutions
for misconduct, simply by virtue of their office. See Levett & Fetherling, supra note 7, at
12, col. 1; MacPherson, Alabama's 'Watergate', Wash. Post, Apr. 3, 1977, § C, at 5, col. 1.
11. The common law defense of good faith and probable cause was applied to § 1983
suits in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967), when the Supreme Court refused to
impose liability on officers for enforcing a statute that they reasonably believed was valid
but was later ruled unconstitutional, see id. at 555 ("A policeman's lot is not so unhappy
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in the defendant's favor.12 On the other hand, the plaintiff's reputa-
tion, if not already sullied by a criminal record, 13 may be called into
question simply because the case arises from a confrontation with the
police.' 4 Finally, juries may be prejudiced against some plaintiffs be-
cause of their race' 5 or unconventional lifestyles.' 6
The second major focus of the Project was an evaluation of the
effect of section 1983 suits on defendants in order to assess whether
such suits hold accountable those responsible for acts of misconduct. 17
In this context, the Project studied the effect that misconduct suits had
on individual officers. Particular attention was given to determining
whether police officers' 8 bore the costs of attorneys' fees, damage
that he must choose between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest
when he has probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does.")
The Second Circuit redefined the good faith defense in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972), as a defense to a proven violation of a citizen's
constitutional right if the defendant reasonably believed in good faith that his actions
were constitutional. The Bivens defense has two components: one part subjective and the
other objective. First, the officer must prove his subjective belief that his action was lawful.
Second, the trier of fact must decide that the officer's belief was reasonable, albeit mis-
taken. Id. at 1348. The significant expansion of the defense was that the police officer
might not be liable because he believed he had probable cause even though he lacked
probable cause for his actions. NATIONAL LAwYERS GUILD, supra note 4, at 60.
The Bivens definition of the good faith defense is followed by most courts. E.g., Bryan
v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc); Boscarino v. Nelson, 518 F.2d 879 (7th
Cir. 1975).
12. See Theis, "Good Faith" as a Defense to Suits for Police Deprivation of Individual
Rights, 59 MINN. L. REv. 991, 1009-12 (1975) (jurors concentrate on officer's belief that his
acts were legal while ignoring question of reasonableness of that belief); Comment, Ac-
countability for Government Misconduct: Limiting Qualified Immunity and the Good
Faith Defense, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 938, 951-53 (1976) (objective component of defense fre-
quently ignored).
13. Note, Municipal Immunity in Police Torts, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 448, 449 (1967)
(criminal record, indicative of poor moral character, hinders "claim against a police
officer"); Note, supra note 5, at 926 n.28 (plaintiff's perceived criminality may be factor
in jury verdicts).
14. Cf. Newman, supra note 3, at 454 ("Frequently the imbalance of jury appeal is
further distorted by the facts of the episode in which the alleged police misconduct
occurred."); Note, supra note 13, at 449 ("In many cases the victim possesses a criminal
record or was attempting to commit a crime at the time the offense against him took place,
items which would decidedly influence the amount of a judgment awarded by a jury, if
not the judgment itself.")
15. Note, supra note 5, at 926 n.28. Jury bias may occur not only in police misconduct
suits but also in civil rights trials generally. See, e.g., Goldfarb & Kurzman, Civil Rights v.
Civil Liberties: The Jury Trial Issue, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 486, 487 (1965); Note, Con-
gressional Provision for Nonjury Trial Under the Seventh Amendment, 83 YALE L.J.
401, 401 (1973).
16. Foote, supra note 9, at 499-501; Theis, supra note 12, at 991. For examples of un-
conventional lifestyles, see p. 792 infra.
17. Newman, supra note 3, at 447-48, 455-57; see R. SULNICK, CIvIL LITIGATION AND THE
POLICE: A METHOD OF COMMUNICATION 24 (1976) (empirical research supporting hypothesis
that civil suits can affect police behavior).
18. Line officers and supervisory personnel were analyzed separately in order to ascer-
tain if differences existed in their experiences as defendants in § 1983 actions. In Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), the Court held that superior officers are liable under § 1983
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awards, and settlements, or whether they were indemnified for these
expenses by their municipal employers or by the municipality's in-
surance carrier.10
The Project also assessed the effect of these suits on the municipalities
and their police departments, which were immune from suit under
section 1983 at the time the studied cases were brought.2 0 Because
police behavior may be influenced by court decrees mandating changes
in police procedure, 21 any use by the courts of such equitable power
only if they participated in, encouraged, or ordered the unconstitutional conduct of lower
officials, id. at 373-77. Rizzo rejected any theory of supervisory liability based on a duty
to the public to eliminate future police misconduct. Id. at 376. Similarly, the doctrine of
respondeat superior has generally been held inapplicable to § 1983 suits. E.g., Johnson .
Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973); Jennings v. Davis, 476
F.2d 1271, 1274-75 (8th Cir. 1973). But see Hesselgesser v. Reilly, 440 F.2d 901 (9th Cir.
1971) (doctrine available in § 1983 action if permitted under state law).
19. See Comment, supra note 12, at 971; Levett & Fetherling, supra note 7, at 12, col. 4.
Recent decisions allude to the effects of indemnifying or insuring defendants in the
§ 1983 context. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 713 n.9 (1978)
(Powell, J., concurring); id. at 717 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Turpin v. Mailet, 579
F.2d 152, 168 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded sub nom. City of W. Haven v. Turpin, 47
U.S.L.W. 3360 (U.S. Nov. 28, 1978) (Oakes, J., concurring).
There are indications that it is becoming increasingly difficult for municipalities to buy
liability insurance covering the torts of their police officers, but this phenomenon seems
more related to the cost of defending an increasing number of suits, see note 3 supra,
than to any drastic increase in the number and amounts of settlements or judgments.
Under Fire, supra note 3, at 39-40; O'Donnell, Undercovered Cops: Police Find It Harder
or Inpossible to Get Any Liability Policies, Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
20. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Court held that municipalities were not "persons"
within the meaning of the statute and, therefore, were immune from suit under § 1983,
id. at 191. In Monell, the Court overruled Monroe, holding municipalities liable under
§ 1983 for actions of employees taken pursuant to unconstitutional policies, ordinances,
regulations, and customs of the municipality. 436 U.S. 658, 690-91. However, the Court
ruled that municipalities are not strictly liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Id. at 691. The Court did not specify what constitutes a showing that the plaintiffs' rights
were violated pursuant to a "custom" or "policy"; thus, Monett's actual breadth is
ambiguous. Because police officers must have significant discretion in the performance of
their duties, much of their behavior is not amenable to control by detailed written
regulations or ordinances. For this reason, the interpretation given to the terms, "custom"
and "policy," may well determine the impact that Monetl will have on police misconduct
cases brought under § 1983.
In another suit, the Second Circuit held that a municipality was liable directly under
the Fourteenth Amendment when its policymakers authorized or ratified the unconstitu-
tional acts of its employees. Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 164 (2d Cir.), vacated and
remanded sub nom. City of WV. Haven v. Turpin, 47 U.S.L.W. 3360 (U.S. Nov. 28, 1978)
(en banc). Turpin alleged that the Board of Police Commissioners had encouraged police
officers to harass him because the Board had not disciplined, but rather had promoted,
an officer against whom Turpin had won a prior § 1983 suit. Id. at 154-55. The court
remanded the case, and permitted Turpin to prove his allegations at trial. Id. at 168. On
appeal to the Supreme Court, judgment was vacated and the case remanded to the Second
Circuit for further consideration in light of Monell. City of W. Haven v. Turpin, 47
U.S.L.W. 3360 (U.S. Nov. 28, 1978).
21. In general, judicial use of equitable relief in misconduct cases has been minimal.
In order to affect police department practices by means of court orders, it was necessary
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was analyzed. Furthermore, the Project sought to determine the extent
to which the costs of indemnifying individual officers encouraged
municipal officials to supervise their police departments more closely.
22
Data for the Project were compiled from a 149-case sample of
Connecticut police misconduct suits filed under section 1983.23 In-
formation was gathered from three sources: court records; 24 personal
interviews25 with various participants in the studied cases, including
to sue supervisory officials, because municipalities themselves were immune from suits
under § 1983 until Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Such
actions were limited by Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), in which the Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of a court of appeals that had upheld an injunction against the
mayor and other supervisory officials in Philadelphia because there was no evidence that
they had actually issued an unconstitutional policy or directed lower level officials to act
unconstitutionally, id. at 377. The Court held that no relief could be granted based upon
a theory of duty to the public to eliminate future police misconduct. Id. at 376. But cf.
Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. District
of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973) (supervisory liability for negligently failing to
train subordinates).
22. Some scholars have suggested that municipal employers are in the best position to
reduce police misconduct. See, e.g., Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 131, 140-41 (1972) ("[E]ven the bad
faith official would respond if the costs were high enough to arouse the ire of his con-
stituency."); Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J.
5, 10 n.29 (1974).
23. The sample is composed of all police misconduct suits that were filed (1) between
January 1, 1970, and December 31, 1973, in the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut, and (2) between January 1, 1974, and September 1, 1977, in the
New Haven Division of that district. These suits have two geographical bases because
prior to January 1, 1974, all federal cases filed in Connecticut were docketed in the
federal courthouse in New Haven, but since that date only the cases filed in the New
Haven Division have been kept there. Cases were selected for inclusion in the sample by
examining the case description on the docket sheets for civil actions.
24. Generally, the court record contained the pleadings, motions, briefs, interrogatories,
and court orders. Depositions are not part of the public record and were not examined
by the Project authors. Trial transcripts were studied but are available only for a few
witnesses in a few trials. Information usually available from the court files included a
factual description of the incident, the procedural history of the case, some personal
characteristics of the parties, and the disposition of the suit. The data from the court
records are on file with the Yale Law Journal and subsequent citations refer to these files.
25. Because police misconduct suits are politically sensitive, the interviewees were
promised anonymity and the interviews were not tape recorded. Each attorney interview,
with one exception, was conducted by two members of the Project. Judges and a magistrate
were questioned by three members of the Project. Typical interview procedures called for
one member to ask questions while the other noted the answers.
To preserve anonymity, each interviewee is identified by a pseudonym, consisting of an
initial and a name. The names were assigned arbitrarily; the initials identify the person's
role in the suits. The initial "P" represents plaintiffs' attorneys; "D", defendants' at-
torneys; "M", attorneys who in different suits had represented both plaintiffs and de-
fendants; "J", judges and the magistrate; and "0", police officials. For example, one
plaintiff's attorney will be cited as "P. Broadway," and one judge will be cited as "J.
Anchor." All interviews were conducted between March 3 and April 6, 1978. Members
and Editors of the Yale Law Journal have checked the accuracy of the citations to the




forty attorneys,2  four federal judges,27 one federal magistrate,28 and
four police officials; 29 and answers by jurors to a mailed question-
naire.30 Of the 163 jurors who deliberated on the trials in the sample,31
26. The 40 attorneys interviewed included 15 plaintiffs' attorneys, 21 defendants' at-
torneys, and 4 attorneys with experience on both sides [hereinafter "mixed attorneys"].
In the Project's sample of § 1983 suits, 59 attorneys appeared as plaintiffs' counsel, 119
appeared as defendants' counsel, and 6 attorneys had experience on both sides.
Intially, 50 attorneys were selected to be interviewed. In order to interview attorneys
with the freshest memories of their cases, the Project attempted to speak to every attorney
who had primary responsibility for a case closed between January 1, 1977, and December
31, 1977. Attorneys with relatively more experience in these suits were also sought out:
the Project attempted to interview all defendants' attorneys who had handled five or more
§ 1983 suits and all plaintiffs' attorneys who had handled two or more § 1983 suits. Several
attorneys were chosen because of their participation in cases that involved particularly
noteworthy factual situations, parties, and requested relief.
Thirteen of the 50 attorneys who were to have been included in the study were not
interviewed. Six declined because their partners had been interviewed, one attorney had
moved and could not be located, and six would not speak with the researchers. Addi-
tionally, three plaintiffs' attorneys who were not included in the original 50 were in-
terviewed in order to obtain the viewpoints of more experienced plaintiffs' attorneys. This
brought the total number of attorneys interviewed to 40.
Each attorney was questioned about jury bias, the good faith defense, compensation,
damages, settlement figures, and the deterrent effect of the suits. See Appendix 1.
27. Four of the five judges of the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut agreed to be interviewed; they were questioned about discovery, the good
faith defense, jury selection, jury bias, damages, reforms, deterrence, and municipal liability
under § 1983. No questionnaire form was created for these interviews, but the same list
of general topics was discussed with each judge.
28. One of the two magistrates in the District of Connecticut was interviewed con-
cerning the pretrial aspects of § 1983 suits.
29. Three police chiefs and one member of a municipal board of police commissioners
were questioned about the departments' administrative procedures for handling civilian
complaints and about the impact of the suits on the departments and the individual of-
ficers. No questionnaire form was created for these interviews; however, the same list of
general topics was discussed with each officer. Three police officials declined to be inter-
viewed.
30. Jurors were contacted only after a waiver of the local rule, D. CONN. R. 12(f), was
obtained from a United States District Judge of the District of Connecticut. Rule 12(f)
prohibits inquiry into the vote or deliberation of any juror. Even with the waiver,
restrictions were placed on the form and dissemination of the questionnaire. The ques-
tionnaire's content was limited to what the individual juror thought; no questions were
permitted about jury deliberations, votes, or the thoughts or comments of other jurors.
The questionnaires were sent under a cover letter from the District Judge and were re-
turned anonymously. Follow-up phone calls to remind the jurors to return the question-
naires were prohibited, but one postcard and one mailgram urging completion of the
questionnaire were sent to each juror. All questionnaires were mailed to jurors on
February 27, 1978; all completed questionnaires were returned on or before March 31,
1978. The jurors were asked about the plaintiffs, the defendants, the attorneys, the good
faith defense, damages, and various factors that might have influenced their decision.
See Appendix 2.
To preserve anonymity, each juror is identified with a number, followed by a citation
to the case on which he sat. For example, one juror will be cited as "Juror #15, in
Clemons v. DiLieto, No. 14660 (D. Conn., filed Oct. 6, 1971)." Members and Editors of the
Yale Law journal have checked the accuracy of the citations to the jurors' answers; the
completed juror questionnaires, however, cannot be made available to the public.
31. Members of 24 juries, which varied in size from five to nine jurors, were sent
questionnaires. There were only 124 individual jurors because 31 jurors (25%) sat in more
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seventy completed the questionnaire.3 2 These seventy were representa-
tive of all the jurors as to sex and outcome of the trial; however, with
respect to age and education the responding group was not optimally
representative of all the jurors.3 3 Because the respondents overrepre-
sented college-educated jurors, jury bias was probably stronger, rather
than weaker, than indicated by the sample evidence.3 4
I. Jury Bias in Police Misconduct Trials
The efficacy of the section 1983 remedy depends upon an adjudica-
tion before an impartial jury. Although jury trials constitute fewer
than one-third of the closed cases in the sample (see Table 1), it is
difficult to overestimate the importance of these cases. Attorneys, when
deciding whether to file a suit or when bargaining over a settlement,
than one trial. Each juror was sent a questionnaire for each trial on which he sat and
was treated as a different person for each trial on which he sat. Because the questionnaires
were required to be returned anonymously, the Project was not able to take into account
the number of trials on which a juror sat in assessing his answers; neither could differences
in the answers of the same juror regarding different trials be analyzed.
32. In addition to the 70 jurors who completed questionnaires, one juror returned an
unanswered questionnaire with a two-page essay on the case. Another juror did not com-
plete a questionnaire but telephoned one of the authors and discussed the case. The
responses of these two jurors were quoted like the comments of other jurors, but the
responses were not coded as answers to specific questions. Furthermore, eight jurors did
not complete the questionnaire because they stated that they could not remember enough
about the trial to answer the questions, and six jurors returned blank questionnaires.
Jury trials were held in the years from 1974 to 1977. The completed questionnaires
overrepresented the later trials in the sample. Every juror who stated that he lacked
memory to answer the questions sat on trials in the first two years. The percentage of
completed questionnaires increased each year, from 25% in 1974 to 55% in 1977.
33. Information about the sex, age, and education of the 163 jurors who deliberated
on the trials was taken from the court's information sheet on each juror. Seventy percent
of the jurors were male, 60% were between 40 and 60 years old, and over 50% had no
more than a high school education. Jurors who responded to the Project questionnaire
stated their sex, age, and educational level. Jurors were also classified according to the
outcome of the trial on which they sat. With this information a comparison as to these
variables was made between all 163 jurors and those who responded to the questionnaire.
A series of chi-square (X2) tests supported observations that the responding jurors were
representative of the total group of deliberating jurors for the variables of sex and out-
come of the trial on which they deliberated. More specifically, for the sex of the juror,
X2-=.31, df = 1, and p> .50 (p is a measure of the significance of the relationship;
probabilities of .05 and less are considered significant, and would demonstrate a lack of
representativeness). For the variable of trial outcome, X2 = 1A3, df = 2, and p = .50.
The responding sample of jurors was not, however, optimally representative of the
population of deliberating jurors with respect to the variables of age or education. Older
and more highly educated jurors showed a greater tendency than others to respond. For
age, x2 = 9.33, df = 4, and p = .05; for education, X2 = 42.6, df = 5, and p < .005.
34. Sociological studies have consistently shown that better educated people hold fewer
prejudices than others. E.g., S. STOUFFER, COMMUNISM, CONFORMITY, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
89-108 (1966) (better-educated Americans more tolerant of nonconformists than others); M.




naturally look for guidance to the results of past jury trials.35 The de-
fendants were successful in twenty of the twenty-eight jury trials in the
sample; in cases in which plaintiffs won, the average verdict was
$5723. 31 Data collected by the Project indicate that the relative in-
frequency of plaintiffs' verdicts and the low damage awards37 are due,
at least in part, to the biases of jurors.
35. See AMERICAN JURY SYSTEMi, supra note 7, at 18-19; Levett & Fetherling, supra note
7, at 12, cols. 3-4.
36. The average award for all jury trials, including plaintiffs' and defendants' verdicts,
was S1484. In comparison, the average payment to the plaintiff in cases that were disposed
of before trial, either by stipulated dismissal or by dismissal on motions, was $3766.
Settlement figures could not be obtained for all settled cases; thus, the $3766 average is
computed on the basis of 32 of the 42 stipulated dismissals in the sample and all of the
16 cases dismissed on motions.
The $3766 average is distorted somewhat because two cases, arising from the same set
of facts, were settled for an amount approximately three times as great as the next largest
settlement. See Court File, Evans v. Salafia, No. 14681 (D. Conn., filed Oct. 21, 1971); Court
File, Perkins v. Salafia, No. 14509 (D. Conn., filed July 2, 1971). Without these cases, the
average settlement would have been $1972.
The two cases arose from a police shooting of two brothers, who, with a third person,
were attempting to rob a safe located in a junior high school. According to the grand
jury report, the third person was an informer and had aided the police in setting a
stakeout for the brothers. The informer had been instructed to wear a conspicuous red
cap to distinguish him from the brothers. After the three men entered the school at
night, the officers shot and killed the two brothers. The brothers were unarmed and a
handgun was planted on them after the shooting. At the coroner's inquest the police
officers claimed they fired in self-defense. Approximately one year later, the informer,
who had been released soon after the incident, was arrested in another state and told the
story. Hartford Courant, Nov. 21, 1970, at 12, col. I & 13. Subsequently, the officers resigned
from the force and admitted that they had planted the handgun; they later were con-
victed of perjury for making false statements at the coroner's inquest. Court File, Perkins
v. Salafia, No. 14509 (D. Conn., filed July 2, 1971).
37. Plaintiffs in police misconduct suits seem less likely than plaintiffs in general to
succeed in recovering damages. See JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, INC., Outstanding Plaintiff
Attorneys, in 6 PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOKS 3274 (Conn. ed. 1976) (any given
plaintiff has 65% probability of being awarded money by jury if case goes to trial). Be-
cause this statistic represents at least some cases in which the defendant did not dispute
liability, a better statistic to compare with police misconduct cases might be one limited
to trials in which the defendant vigorously opposed the plaintiff's version of the story.
Thus, a more relevant statistic is the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff in cases in
which two automobiles crashed at an intersection and each driver maintained that the
green light was in his favor. See JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, INC., Intersection Collisions, in 3
PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOKS 18 (Conn. ed. 1978) (plaintiff won 49% of such
cases in 1977) [hereinafter cited as Intersection Collisions]. In contrast, plaintiffs in the
Project sample won only 26% of the cases they took to a jury.
Police misconduct plaintiffs also seem to be disadvantaged in the amount of damages
awarded when they do win a case. The average verdict to be expected in Connecticut in
1977, in an automobile crash case in which both parties claimed a green light and the
plaintiff suffered a simple concussion (less than $500 special damages) and minor in-
juries, can be derived in the following way. The nationwide average of the plaintiffs'
verdicts for cases of this type in 1977 was $4524. JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, INC., Tables of
Verdict Expectancy Values for Concussion, in 1 PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOKS
1021 (Conn. ed. 1978). This figure is increased by a factor of 20%, i.e., to $5428, because
verdicts in New Haven, Connecticut, average 20% higher than verdicts nationwide. JURY
VERDICT RESEARCH, INC., Connecticut Verdict Survey: Area Verdict Guide, in 1 PERSONAL
INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOKS 2 (Conn. ed. 1977). Because the plaintiff has a 49% chance
789




Gases remaining open39  59
Gases dismissed on motions40  16









of winning such a verdict, the expected value of such a case is (A9) ($5428), or about
$2700. Intersection Collisions, supra, at 18. The police misconduct suits most closely
analogous to such a personal injury suit are the excessive force cases. See note 61 infra.
Both actions involve easily observable physical injuries. Excessive force awards in the
Project sample, including both settled and tried cases, successful and unsuccessful,
averaged only $1150, even though injuries in the Project cases were often more severe than
in the automobile accident cases chosen for comparison.
38. The classification is made based upon the disposition of the last remaining cause
of action against the last remaining defendant in each case. Thus, if the chief of police
and a line officer were sued, even if the chief were granted a motion of summary judg-
ment, the case would be classified as "jury trial" if the line officer was tried before a jury.
39. "Cases remaining open" consists of those suits that were being litigated and in
which no judgment had been entered by February 1, 1978, the date research was com-
pleted.
40. "Cases dismissed on motions" includes one summary judgment and one directed
verdict; the remaining cases were closed because (I) the plaintiff voluntarily dropped the
lawsuit without a settlement, or (2) the defendant prevailed on a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action, for lack of prosecution, or for lack of jurisdiction.
41. "Cases with stipulated dismissals" includes those suits that were settled out of court
by mutual accord.
42. Although there were 28 jury trials, questionnaires were mailed to members of only
24 juries. Four of the cases were consolidated for one trial. Since only jurors who sat on
trials in the New Haven and Bridgeport Divisions were permitted to be surveyed, the
jurors who sat on the two jury trials in the Hartford Division were not sent questionnaires.
See Court File, Gonzales v. Ganley, No. 14383 (D. Conn., filed May 4, 1971); Court File,
Jones v. City of Hartford, No. 13991 (D. Conn., filed Aug. 24, 1970). One case was tried
twice; in the first trial the jury was deadlocked, but on retrial, the defendants won. Only
the result of the second trial is included in Table 1, but members of both juries were
mailed questionnaires. See Court File, Clemons v. DiLieto, No. 14660 (D. Conn., filed Oct.
6, 1971).
One case with multiple plaintiffs and multiple defendants resulted in a jury verdict
for some of the plaintiffs and for some of the defendants; this case was classified as a
plaintiffs' verdict. See Court File, Williams v. DiLieto, No. 15646 (D. Conn., filed Feb. 28,
1973). Another classification problem was the consolidation of four suits for one jury trial,
which resulted in plaintiffs' verdicts for three cases and in a defendants' verdict for the
fourth case. Court File, Pence v. White, No. 15154 (D. Conn., filed July 5, 1972) (de-
fendants' verdict); Court File, Ramos v. DiLieto, No. 14652 (D. Conn., filed Sept. 30,
1971); Court File, Gray v. DiLieto, No. 14640 (D. Conn., filed Sept. 21, 1971); Court File,
Smith v. DiLieto, No. 14624 (D. Conn., filed Sept. 15, 1971). Hence, three of the plaintiffs'
verdicts were awarded by one jury.
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Suing the Police
A. Biases Against Plaintiffs
1. Description of Plaintiffs
In order to understand why prejudice exists against the plaintiffs
who bring section 1983 suits against the police, it is necessary to know
the characteristics of the plaintiffs, and the activities underlying their
allegations of misconduct. About forty percent of the suits in the
sample were brought by nonwhite plaintiffs.
Table 2: Plaintiffs' Race





Not available 16 10.7
Total 149 99.9
Many, but not all, of the plaintiffs are poor.4 3 Although the court
files do not usually contain references to the plaintiffs' income, in-
dications of their financial condition do exist. For example, motions to
proceed in forma pauperis were granted in fifteen percent of the
sample cases. 44 Difficulties with the discovery process also highlight the
plaintiffs' lack of financial resources. Although both plaintiffs' and
defendants' attorneys saw depositions as the best method of discovery, 45
plaintiffs generally could not afford to take them.
46
43. One exception was a physician who alleged that he was falsely arrested as he
collected signatures for a petition urging the impeachment of President Nixon. Court
File, Abramovitz v. DiLieto, No. N-74-248 (D. Conn., filed Oct. 21, 1974). In another case,
an inhalation therapist with a $14,000-a-year income alleged that he was falsely arrested.
Court File, Martin v. Consiglio, No. 14741 (D. Conn., filed Nov. 19, 1971).
44. In at least 22 of the 149 cases, the plaintiffs moved to proceed in forma tauperis.
To proceed in forma pauperis, a plaintiff must state in good faith that he cannot afford
to pay filing costs without depriving himself of the necessities of life. J. Anchor; see
Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1948); 28 U.S.C. § 1915
(1976).
45. Attorneys were asked what information could be obtained with depositions that
was not available through other means of discovery; 30 of the 40 attorneys responded by
noting several advantages of depositions relative to other discovery devices. Among the
advantages mentioned were the opportunity to question the deponent directly and thus
ascertain what type of witness he will make, the ability to ask follow-up questions to eva-
sive answers, and the possibility of using the deposition to impeach the witness at trial.
E.g., P. Broadway, P. Davenport.
46. E.g., P. Gypsy, P. Sherman. One attempt to reduce the cost of depositions has been
to depose witnesses by tape recorder. The court has allowed such a procedure for indigent
defendants. See Court File, Gray v. DiLieto, No. 14640 (D. Conn., filed Sept. 21, 1971).
However, the court requires that the taped deposition be transcribed, a process that makes
such depositions almost as expensive as regular depositions. P. Broadway.
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An accurate description of these plaintiffs shows not only their race
and financial resources, but also that many of the persons who sue the
police are perceived as unattractive. 47 Many are involved in the drug
subculture; 48 some have been arrested for prostitution; 49 more than a
few have had past brushes with the law;a5 others are gay.51 A few can
only be described as extraordinary individuals.5
2
The activities that precede a confrontation with the police are
diverse. 53 The majority of these suits are filed as the result of a single
confrontation between a citizen and a police officer. Typical of such
actions are domestic quarrels to which the police are summoned,5 4
searches of homes predicated on warrants obtained with falsely sworn
affidavits, 55 and arrests for drunk driving in which excessive force is
used by the police. 56
Some of the suits do not result from an isolated confrontation, but
issue instead from a series or group of confrontations with the police
arising out of a common incident or set of circumstances. Thus, among
the earliest filed cases in the sample are the "Cocaine-Quinine" cases, a
series of six suits alleging that numerous people had been arrested on
fabricated charges of possessing cocaine.57 Four of the shooting cases in
47. D. Delmonico, J. York.
48. E.g., Court File, Burns v. Celentano, No. 15469 (D. Conn., filed Nov. 28, 1972)
(plaintiff arrested after heroin found in her apartment); Court File, Cretella v. DiLullo,
No. 14891 (D. Conn., filed Feb. 14, 1972) (defendant allegedly supplied plaintiff with
narcotics and then forced him to become informer).
49. E.g., Court File, Allen v. Logue, No. N-76-235 (D. Conn., filed July 7, 1976) (action
to stop harassment of women with numerous prostitution convictions); Court File, Clinton
v. City of West Haven, No. N-76-38 (D. Conn., filed Jan. 23, 1976) (masseuse arrested for
prostitution).
50. E.g., D. Dwight (three plaintiffs in consolidated trial had total of 14 felony con-
victions among them); see p. 798 infra.
51. E.g., Court File, Clifford v. Runlett, No. N-75-226 (D. Conn., filed Sept. 25, 1975)
(class action to stop harassment of homosexuals).
52. E.g., Court File, Smith v. DiLieto, No. 14624 (D. Conn., filed Sept. 15, 1971) (man
filed suit; at time of trial was in process of changing sex).
53. The descriptions in the following two paragraphs and the notes that accompany
them are taken from the complaints.
54. E.g., Court File, Sanders v. Cartocetti, No. N-77-183 (D. Conn., filed Apr. 22, 1977)
(wife telephones police after quarrel with husband; police upon arrival beat husband);
Court File, Heyward v. LeGrand, No. N-77-172 (D. Conn., filed Apr. 15, 1977) (police
summoned to domestic quarrel; beat male).
55. E.g., Court File, Burns v. Celentano, No. 15469 (D. Conn., filed Nov. 28, 1972);
Court File, Faiella v. Harvey, No. 15412 (D. Conn., filed Oct. 80, 1972).
56. E.g., Court File, Klymuk v. Pichnarcik, No. N-76-344 (D. Conn., filed Oct. 13, 1976)
(plaintiff taken to police station following automobile accident because he had been
drinking; at station, was denied medical care and injuries aggravated by beating); Court
File, Thornhill v. McAfee, No. 14586 (D. Conn., filed Aug. 24, 1971) (plaintiff beaten at
scene of arrest and at hospital in doctors' presence).
57. The cocaine was allegedly purchased by two police informers on the instructions
of certain police officers, and then planted on the plaintiffs either by the informers or the
officers themselves. Subsequent tests by the Connecticut State Department of Health
showed the planted substance to be quinine, not cocaine. The plaintiffs sued for damages
Suing the Police
the sample arose from racially motivated civil disturbances in Hartford,
Connecticut." In another group, a police search for dealers in stolen
antiques resulted in three suits filed against the police because the
search warrants used were invalid.59 Table 3 shows all of the cases in
the sample classified according to the basis of the case. 60
Table 3: Basis of the Case 61
Number of % of
suits total suits
Shooting 16 10.7
Excessive force 24 16.1
Excessive force/false arrest 38 25.5
False arrest 32 21.5
Illegal search 25 16.8
Harassment 8 5.4
Deprivation of First Amendment rights 4 2.7
Other 2 1.3
Total 149 100.0
due to illegal searches and false arrests. Court File, Pence v. White, No. 15154 (D. Conn.,
filed July 5, 1972); Court File, Torres v. DiLieto, No. 14904 (D. Conn., filed Feb. 18, 1972);
Court File, Johnson v. DiLieto, No. 14855 (D. Conn., filed Jan. 24, 1972); Court File,
Ramos v. DiLieto, No. 14652 (D. Conn., filed Sept. 30, 1971); Court File, Gray v. DiLieto,
No. 14640 (D. Conn., filed Sept. 21, 1971); Court File, Smith v. DiLieto, No. 14624 (D.
Conn., filed Sept. 15, 1971). The Torres and Johnson cases were dismissed because the
plaintiffs could not be located at the time of the trial. Smith, Gray, and Ramos won, but
Pence lost, in a consolidated trial.
58. Court File, Bramlet v. City of Hartford, No. 14551 (D. Conn., filed July 28, 1971);
Court File, Gonzales v. Ganley, No. 14383 (D. Conn., filed May 4, 1971); Court File, Jones
v. City of Hartford, No. 13991 (D. Conn., filed Aug. 24, 1970); Court File, Rivera v.
Sullivan, No. 13931 (D. Conn., filed July 6, 1970). In one case a police officer shot the
decedent, who was standing on the street 247 feet away. After the administrator of the
estate had rejected a settlement offer of .545,000, the jury returned a verdict of no liability.
Court File, Gonzales v. Ganley, No. 14383 (D. Conn., filed May 4, 1971) (information about
settlement negotiations from attorney interviews).
59. Court File, Clifford v. Town of Madison, No. 15763 (D. Conn., filed May 22, 1973);
Court File, Nyholt v. Bell, No. 15302 (D. Conn., filed Sept. 7, 1972); Court File, DelVecchio
v. Dana, No. 15198 (D. Conn., filed July 20, 1972). The first two cases were settled before
trial; the latter resulted in a plaintiff's verdict at trial.
60. The Project authors summarized the allegations of the complaints as the court
files were studied. Then each author read each summary and independently decided the
"basis of the case." Following comparisons of results, all discrepancies were eliminated.
The "basis of the case" is defined as the type of misconduct that precipitated the other
allegations. For example, a plaintiff may allege that he was falsely arrested, that his body
and personal effects were illegally searched, that he was falsely imprisoned as he awaited
bail, and that he was maliciously prosecuted at his arraignment. If all police actions
subsequent to the arrest adhered to proper police procedure, then the basis of the case is
false arrest. If multiple plaintiffs alleged separate incidents of misconduct in a single case,
the type of misconduct common to every plaintiff is chosen as the basis of the case.
Similarly, if different suits were brought by multiple plaintiffs involved in the same
incident, each individual suit is assigned a basis of the case.
61. The categories of misconduct are defined as follows:
a. Shooting is the wounding or killing of a human being with a firearm. Not included
is the mere discharge of a weapon.
b. Excessive force means all uses of excessive force except shooting, but does not in-
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2. Racial Prejudice
The Project data indicate juror prejudice against nonwhite plaintiffs.
The first indication of this prejudice is the difference between the
percentage of successful suits brought by white plaintiffs and those
brought by black plaintiffs in jury trials. White plaintiffs won three of
seven jury trials, or approximately forty-three percent, but black plain-
tiffs won only three of sixteen trials, or nineteen percent.6 2 The con-
trast becomes starker if it is noted that two of the three successful black
plaintiffs gained their victories in the Cocaine-Quinine trial, a con-
solidated action tried before a single jury. Two of the police defendants
in that case had been dismissed from their jobs prior to the trial as a
result of an internal police department investigation into the activities
surrounding the incident.
63
The difference in damage awards between successful white and black
plaintiffs further supports the inference that the juries were racially
prejudiced. Although the total number of plaintiffs' verdicts was small,
the award differential was unmistakable: the average award for the
three successful whites was over $7600; the average award for the three
successful blacks was $1400.64 Black plaintiffs, therefore, not only won
elude those cases in which it is impossible to determine whether the basis of the case was
excessive force or a false arrest.
c. Excessive force/false arrest cases are those suits in which a plaintiff alleges both
brutality and an illegal arrest, and in which the court files do not disclose which improper
act occurred first.
d. False arrest is an arrest without probable cause.
e. Illegal search is either a warrantless search without probable cause, or a search
pursuant to a defective warrant.
f. Harassment is the practice of unjustifiably interfering with or disturbing a plaintiff
because of his lifestyle, race, or some other reason.
g. Deprivation of First Amendment rights cases are those in which the plaintiff's
freedom of expression, either political or artistic, has been infringed.
h. Other includes two cases that do not fit any of the categories. One plaintiff alleged
that he had been enslaved by the police through the use of addictive drugs; the other
claimed denial of medical care that resulted in the death of a man soon after he had
been taken into police custody.
62. There were 28 cases with jury trials in the sample. Sixteen were brought by black
plaintiffs, eight by white plaintiffs (one had a hung jury), and three by Hispanic plain-
tiffs. In one jury trial the race of the plaintiff could not be determined from the data.
For a discussion of the sample size and statistical validity, see note 6 supra.
63. See note 57 supra (citing cases).
64. One of the seven plaintiffs' verdicts in the sample was won by an Hispanic plain-
tiff, for $13,000, in the Cocaine-Quinine case. Court File, Ramos v. DiLieto, No. 14652 (D.
Conn., filed Sept. 30, 1971).
If the number of cases is expanded beyond jury trials won by plaintiffs to include
those cases in which there was a jury trial with a defendants' verdict, the average award
for white plaintiffs was over $3250, for blacks $262. Thus, when money was awarded by
a jury, white plaintiffs averaged over five times as much as blacks. If the unsuccessful
plaintiffs are included, the statistics show that the average black plaintiff received from
the jury less than one-twelfth the amount won by the average white.
Including settled cases in the calculus does not significantly alter the conclusions. In
all cases-settied, tried, or disposed of.by the court in some other manner-the awards or
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less often than whites, but when blacks did win, they were awarded
less money.
Several jurors, from different trials, said that racial prejudice was an
important factor in their jury's decision, even though no questionnaire
item specifically asked about racial prejudice. 65 One juror expressed
sympathy for the police, stating, "I believe police officers have a dif-
ficult job working in a minority community they are subject to abuse
above and beyond the call of duty. I feel that this played a strong part
in our verdict." 66 A second juror indicated concern that the racial
differences between the jurors and the plaintiff made a fair trial
difficult: "[B]eing the only minority on the case & the rest of the
juror being from outside N.H. [New Haven] I found this a problem
also."07 Another juror, noting that even when a juror recognizes his
own biases, he is bound to overcompensate or undercompensate for
them, questioned whether it was possible to remain "impartial and
logical." 8 Finally, one white juror, who said he came "from the ghetto"
and "knows" about police misconduct, asserted that two factors decided
the case he heard: the plaintiff's "color" (black) and his previous
criminal record. As this juror saw it, "[w]hen behind the door [to the
jury room], there is so much prejudice that it is not funny."69
A number of attorneys also indicated that they felt nonwhite plain-
tiffs were severely disadvantaged.Th One simply stated that whites are
more likely to succeed at trial and argued that in one of his cases in
which a black plaintiff had won, the damage award was lower than a
white would have received. 71 Another placed great importance on
whether the plaintiff was "white and middle class." 72 One attorney
bluntly asserted that "blacks are in a much worse position."73
settlements received by white plaintiffs averaged $5565, by blacks $440. If the two largest
settlements are omitted, see note 36 sul~ra, the average for whites drops to $2935. If, in
addition, all cases in which the plaintiff received no money are omitted, the average
recovery becomes $4893 for whites and $1246 for blacks.
65. No questionnaire item specifically asks about the juror's racial prejudice because
it was thought that jurors would not be candid regarding their own prejudices; moreover,
the restrictions on the juror questionnaire prevented asking jurors about the racial preju-
dices of their fellow jury members. See note 30 supra.
66. Juror #107, in Garcia v. Carozza, No. N-74-51 (D. Conn., filed Feb. 27, 1974)
(Hispanic plaintiff; defendant's verdict). All juror comments are reported verbatim and
with their original spelling and punctuation.
67. Juror identification withheld to protect anonymity.
68. Juror #15, in Clemons v. DiLieto, No. 14660 (D. Conn., filed Oct. 6, 1971) (black
plaintiff; defendant's verdict).
69. Juror #155, in Gaddy ex rel. Jackson v. Gaglione, No. N-75-97 (D. Conn., filed
Apr. 7, 1975) (black plaintiff; defendant's verdict).
70. Several attorneys stated that the plaintiff's race was one of the most important
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3. Lifestyle Prejudice
Many of the plaintiffs who brought police misconduct suits had
deviant or unusual lifestyles. The outcomes of the jury trials suggest
that the jurors were biased against these plaintiffs. Jury verdicts were
awarded to seven plaintiffs. Except for the plaintiffs in the Cocaine-
Quinine cases,74 all of the winning plaintiffs were gainfully employed
at the time of the alleged misconduct. 75 Even in the Cocaine-Quinine
cases, the lifestyles of the three successful plaintiffs apparently affected
the jurors' determination of damages: the two plaintiffs with several
felony convictions received substantially less money than the plaintiff
whose arrest record was not known by the jury.76 In contrast, unsuc-
cessful plaintiffs often, though not always, had characteristics that may
have limited their jury appeal.7 7 One was a high school dropout;
78
others were "long-haired" students who demonstrated against the Viet-
nam War;7 9 some were alcoholics or heavy drinkers;80 another was a
member of a motorcycle gang;8' and yet another was chronically un-
employed.
8 2
74. See pp. 792-94 sutra.
75. One black plaintiff was an inhalation therapist at Yale-New Haven Hospital who
earned approximately $14,000 per year. Court File, Martin v. Consiglio, No. 14741 (D.
Conn., filed Nov. 19, 1971). A second plaintiff was a white garage mechanic and was
married, with two children. Court File, DelVecchio v. Dana, No. 15198 (D. Conn., filed
July 20, 1972). The plaintiff who was awarded the largest amount by a jury was a young
white male working two jobs as an upholsterer; he had assigned the proceeds of any award
to repay the welfare benefits he and his dependents had received while he was disabled
from the injuries inflicted by the defendant officer. Court File, Delecke ex rel. Delecke v.
Tsolis, No. 15244 (D. Conn., filed Aug. 10, 1972). In a fourth case, the defendants were
accused of using excessive force against several student antiwar demonstrators and falsely
arresting a newspaper photographer covering the event; although all the student plaintiffs
lost, the newspaper photographer was awarded damages for being falsely arrested and
having his camera destroyed. Court File, Williams v. DiLieto, No. 15646 (D. Conn., filed
Feb. 28, 1973). It should be noted that not all gainfully employed plaintiffs won. See, e.g.,
Court File, Abramovitz v. DiLieto, No. N-74-248 (D. Conn., filed Oct. 21, 1974).
76. See p. 798 infra.
77. Information on the plaintiffs' lifestyles was gathered from the complaints, from
answers to interrogatories, and from attorney interviews. The descriptions compiled were
neither complete nor systematic; thus, insufficient data are available to isolate the effect
on the jury of any one aspect of a plaintiff's lifestyle.
Furthermore, some unsuccessful plaintiffs had attractive lifestyles. For example, one
plaintiff, a psychiatrist who taught at Yale University, alleged that he was falsely arrested
outside a local department store while he was gathering signatures for a petition urging
the impeachment of former President Nixon. Court File, Abramovitz v. DiLieto, No. N-74-
248 (D. Conn., filed Oct. 21, 1974). One attorney suggested that the jurors were preju-
diced against this plaintiff because he was a professor at Yale. P. Naples.
78. Court File, Garcia v. Carozza, No. N-74-51 (D. Conn., filed Feb. 27, 1974).
79. Court File, Williams v. DiLieto, No. 15646 (D. Conn., filed Feb. 28, 1973).
80. P. Calhoun.
81. Court File, Acampora v. D'Urso, No. N-75-134 (D. Conn., filed May 23, 1975).
82. In a suit brought by the administrator of the deceased's estate, it was shown that
the deceased was a furniture mover with a net worth of $133.82; he had filed no income
tax returns for the past three years. Court File, Gonzales v. Ganley, No. 14383 (D. Conn.,
filed May 4, 1971).
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The jurors were emphatic in describing what it was about the plain-
tiffs that bothered them.8 3 A juror said, "The plaintiff's life style was
what caused his problems. '8 One juror replied nothing more than
"[i]mmoral" to the question of how the plaintiff's lifestyle affected his
verdict.8 5 Another respondent wrote that "[i]t was their obvious con-
tempt for law and order" and their "out 'looking for a fight attitude' "6
that affected his verdict.
Even some of the jurors who denied that the plaintiff's lifestyle had
any effect upon them nevertheless offered revealing information. One
juror disclaimed any effect on her personally, but was "positive" that
the plaintiff's lifestyle affected other jurors.87 Another, who claimed
that the plaintiff's lifestyle did not influence him, went on to say that
"[w]here he was living, his girl friend, the witnesses he produced-I am
putting collectively into 'lifestyle.' They all contributed to lack of
credibility."88
Two jurors said that the plaintiffs' lifestyles affected them in favor
of the plaintiffs. One explained that the plaintiff, who was victorious
at trial, was helped by the fact that he was a solid citizen: "He is the
head of his household and resides there with his wife and family."89
The other juror was obviously aware of potential bias:
83. A series of items on the questionnaire concerned lifestyle prejudice: jurors were
asked, (1) "Did the plaintiff's lifestyle affect your verdict?" (2) "If yes, in what way was
your verdict affected?" and (3) "If yes, please write in the space below what it was about
the plaintiff's lifestyle that affected your verdict." See Appendix 2, question 6. No juror
answered that he had been influenced "greatly" by the plaintiff's lifestyle, but 10 said
that the lifestyle had "some" effect. Fifty-nine jurors said the lifestyle had no effect.
When asked how the plaintiff's lifestyle affected them, six jurors said "against the
plaintiff." These answers came from jurors on five different trials, four of which resulted
in a defendant's verdict, and one of which had a jury deadlock. The plaintiff in one case
was connected with illicit drug traffic and had a long police record that included several
serious convictions. Court File, Clemons v. DiLieto, No. 14660 (D. Conn., filed Oct. 6,
1971). Another plaintiff, carrying a bullwhip, was stopped by the police while he was
walking down a city street. Court File, Rawls v. DiLieto, No. 14751 (D. Conn., filed Nov.
26, 1971).
Even though the questionnaire item used the nonpejorative term "lifestyle" in asking
about possible prejudice, it is suspected that some jurors were reluctant to admit their
biases. Restrictions placed on the questionnaire prevented asking jurors whether other
jurors exhibited such prejudice. See note 30 supra.
84. Juror #10, in Clemons v. DiLieto, No. 14660 (D. Conn., filed Oct. 6, 1971) (hung
jury).
85. Juror #30, in Rawls v. DiLieto, No. 14751 (D. Conn., filed Nov. 26, 1971) (de-
fendant's verdict).
86. Juror #159, in Acampora v. D'Urso, No. N-75-134 (D. Conn., filed May 23, 1975)
(defendant's verdict).
87. Juror #114, in Penque v. Runlett, No. N-74-237 (D. Conn., filed Oct. 11, 1974)
(hung jury).
88. Juror #39, in Bell v. White, No. 14836 (D. Conn., filed Jan. 10, 1972) (defendant's
verdict).
89. Juror #61, in DelVecchio v. Dana, No. 15198 (D. Conn., filed July 20, 1972) (plain-
tiff's verdict) (white garage mechanic, married, two children).
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In an attempt to counter my own and others prejudices, weighted
the evidence of the plaintiff a bit more carefully S heavily. At best
it was difficult to remain unbiased one way or the other as plain-
tiff was black with a police record and friends of the same descrip-
tion.90
A frequent and salient indicator of the plaintiff's lifestyle-past
criminal record-may have particularly affected jurors. At least eight
of the unsuccessful plaintiffs had prior criminal records that often in-
cluded multiple convictions.91 Excluding the Cocaine-Quinine case,
one of the four successful plaintiffs had one criminal conviction; the
other three had none.9 2 Criminal records seem also to have affected the
Cocaine-Quinine trial. The jurors in that trial were aware of the felony
convictions of two of the successful plaintiffs, but the arrest record of
a third was not in evidence.03 Although the injuries of the first two
plaintiffs were more serious than those of the third,94 the former
received $200095 and $500,96 respectively, and the latter received
$18,000.
97
The jurors' comments reveal a strong negative reaction toward plain-
tiffs who had experienced previous trouble with the law. One juror
questioned the credibility of the plaintiff, explaining: "The plaintiff
& his witnesses were obviously black and streetwise, prostitutes,
90. Juror #15, in Clemons v. DiLieto, No. 14660 (D. Conn., filed Oct. 6, 1971) (de-
fendant's verdict) (black with 30 prior arrests, many convictions).
91. The criminal records ranged from one conviction for the sale of narcotics, Court
File, Gonzales v. Ganley, No. 14383 (D. Conn., filed May 4, 1971), to numerous convictions
on 30 prior arrests including 2 drug offenses, 11 assaults, and 1 rape. Court File, Clemons
v. DiLieto, No. 14660 (D. Conn., filed Oct. 6, 1971). Prior criminal records were present in
at least six other cases. Court File, Acampora v. D'Urso, No. N-75-134 (D. Conn., filed
May 23, 1975) (information about criminal record from juror comments); Court File,
Gaddy ex rel. Jackson v. Gaglione, No. N-75-97 (D. Conn., filed Apr. 7, 1975) (informa-
tion about criminal record from juror comments); Court File, Penque v. Runlett, No.
N-74-237 (D. Conn., filed Oct. 11, 1974) (information about criminal record from juror
comments); Court File, Guest v. Homer, No. 15257 (D. Conn., filed Aug. 15, 1972); Court
File, Rawls v. DiLieto, No. 14751 (D. Conn., filed Nov. 26, 1971); Court File, Jones v. City
of Hartford, No. 13991 (D. Conn., filed Aug. 24, 1970). Other unsuccessful plaintiffs may
have had criminal records that were not indicated by the data.
92. One plaintiff was on probation for a robbery conviction at the time of the alleged
misconduct. Court File, Delecke ex rel. Delecke v. Tsolis, No. 15244 (D. Conn., filed Aug.
10, 1972). The other three successful plaintiffs had no previous arrests. Court File,
Williams v. DiLieto, No. 15646 (D. Conn., filed Feb. 28, 1973); Court File, DelVecchio v.
Dana, No. 15198 (D. Conn., filed July 20, 1972); Court File, Martin v. Consiglio, No. 14741
(D. Conn., filed Nov. 19, 1971).
93. D. Moore.
94. Interview with attorney of a party (name withheld).
95. Court File, Gray v. DiLieto, No. 14640 (D. Conn., filed Sept. 21, 1971).
96. Court File, Smith v. DiLieto, No. 14624 (D. Conn., filed Sept. 15, 1971).
97. Court File, Ramos v. DiLieto, No. 14652 (D. Conn., filed Sept. 30, 1971).
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junkies-one currently serving a sentence. Against two white police-
men. In this case, I felt it came down to whom did I believe more. A
difficult choice to fairly make based upon courtroom proceedings
only."98s Although the Federal Rules of Evidence allow introduction of
a witness's prior convictions only in order to impeach his credibility, 99
this juror indicated that the decisive factor for him in a difficult case
was that the plaintiff and his witnesses were black and streetwise, and
had criminal records.
Another juror blandly stated that the plaintiff "had been previously
arrested," and "the police action was justified."100 A third juror, like
the first, suggested a connection between criminal activity and minority
group membership:
I've seen quite a few changes in the law since my youth. We are
now at the age of protecting minority groups, criminals, etc. under
the guise of people's rights. Twisting of laws by "smart" attornies,
securing large damage claims, etc. has made a farce out of some
court cases. Vandalism, violence, muggings, etc. has made a tre-
mendous upsurge. We need to get back to the basic law-"Eye for
an Eye.' 01
One attorney emphasized the importance of the "middle-classness"
of the plaintiff; 102 many others mentioned that the plaintiff's life-
style' 03 or criminal record' 0 4 was likely to influence the jury's decision.
In sum, it is clear that jurors were not impartial, but were frequently
biased against the plaintiffs in section 1983 suits brought against police.
The outcomes of the suits, the damages awarded, the comments of
jurors, and the remarks of attorneys indicated bias against nonwhite
plaintiffs. Similar data demonstrate that jurors were prejudiced against
plaintiffs with nonmiddle-class lifestyles, and particularly against plain-
tiffs with prior criminal records.
98. Juror #15, in Clemons v. DiLieto, No. 14660 (D. Conn., filed Oct. 6, 1971) (de-
fendant's verdict).
99. FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
100. Juror #115, in Penque v. Runlett, No. N-74-237 (D. Conn., filed Oct. 11, 1974)
(hung jury).
101. Juror #159, in Acampora v. D'Urso, No. N-75-134 (D. Conn., filed May 23, 1975)
(defendant's verdict).
102. P. Calhoun.
103. Seven attorneys said that the plaintiff's lifestyle was one of the most important
factors in determining the outcome of these suits. P. Calhoun, P. Silliman, D. Chao, D.
Delmonico, D. Dwight, D. Griswold, D. Moore.
104. The plaintiff's criminal record was mentioned by seven attorneys as one of the
most important factors in determining the outcome of the cases. P. Calhoun, P. Rudy, P.
deVille, D. Arcadia, D. Leon, D. Moore, D. Oxford.
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B. Bias in Favor of Police Officers
The Project measured the jury appeal of defendant policemen, be-
cause it was thought that police might profit from the aura of authority
and honesty surrounding their office.10° Jurors were questioned about
their reactioris to police as defendants, and the opinions of judges and
attorneys were also sought. The influence on jury decisions of the good
faith defense, available to police officers in section 1983 suits, also was
examined.
1. Description of Pro-Police Bias
An analysis of juror comments, along with the observations of ex-
perienced attorneys and judges, presents substantial evidence of a pro-
police bias.' 06 According to one juror:
I feel we have handcuffed our policemen because they are afraid
of misconduct suits. How can a policeman do his job in handling
a rowdy or rough person and still protect himself without using
some excessive force? I'd like to see howl We need to back up our
policeman, encourage them if they do a good job-be proud of
them, instead of continually harassing them.
10 7
A second juror admitted he gave the defendant the benefit of any doubt
because he was a policeman acting in the course of his duties:
There seemed to be right & wrong on both sides. The reason
I leaned toward defendant rather than plaintiff was because de-
fendant was acting under request by citizens & instruction by
(Police) Dept.
Had defendant not been an officer sent in response to a request,
my decision might have been otherwise.' 0 8
Another juror, who said he was not affected by the defendant's status,
thought that some jurors were "reluctant" to find a police officer
liable, even when the weight of the evidence favored the plaintiff. 10 9
105. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 3, at 454; Note, supra note 5, at 923.
106. Examining the outcome of the trials was not helpful. Because all of the defendants
were police officers, no comparison of verdicts could be made.
107. Juror #159, in Acampora v. D'Urso, No. N-75-134 (D. Conn., filed May 23, 1975)
(defendant's verdict).
108. Juror #93, in Brown v. Osborn, No. 15776 (D. Conn., filed June 13, 1973) (de-
fendant's verdict) (emphasis in original).
109. Juror #116, in Penque v. Runlett, No. N-74-237 (D. Conn., filed Oct. 11, 1974)
(hung jury) ("It seems to me that where a police or law enforcement agent is a defendent
in a case concerning John Q. Citizen; some juror are reluctant to find the police officer
guilty. Even when the evidents points to a guilty verdict.")
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Similarly, another jury member seemed distressed by the pro-police bias
he noted among his fellows: "People are in love with their law enforce-
ment agencies, but they are just as crooked as the crooks." 110
One juror disclosed a presumption in favor of defendants in police
misconduct suits even as he recognized the officers' imperfections:
Traditionally this case is "good guys" vs "bad guys"-only now
the "bad" are using the law against the "good." Realizing police-
men are human beings with all accompanying imperfections, one
cannot automatically judge them right. The decision as to where
the line between reasonable and excessive force is calls for much
thought &: consideration. 1 '
Another juror, who voted to hold a police defendant liable in an illegal
search case, expressed a similar presumption, but in this instance it was
overcome by the facts of the case: "It was difficult to realize an officer
could do wrong, knowing the law. Easy [to decide the case] because it
was obviously wrong in the manner it was done."
' 1 2
Juror comments regarding police defendants reveal varying degrees
of prejudice. Some can be categorized as examples of blatant pro-police
bias, others as weaker statements of a presumption in favor of police
officers. Nonetheless, the importance of the bias should not be under-
estimated. Plaintiffs and defendants in these cases usually offer radically
different versions of the facts,"13 and testimony that corroborates the
story of either side is often unavailable because "few arrests, searches,
or uses of force occur in the presence of disinterested witnesses." 14 In
such cases, if the defendant begins the trial with an edge in credibility,
the likelihood that the advantage will be overcome is small; if the de-
fendant benefits also from actual prejudice among the jurors, the out-
come is almost certain. In order to prevail, the plaintiff must prove
the defendant's liability by much more than the legally mandated
preponderance of the evidence.
The attorney interviews also suggest that police officers have an ad-
vantage. This advantage was more often described as a pro-police bias
110. Juror #155, in Gaddy ex rel. Jackson v. Gaglione, No. N-75-97 (D. Conn., filed
Apr. 7, 1975) (defendant's verdict). This juror claimed to be the only proplaintiff mem-
ber of the jury; however, he made the vote unanimous after an hour of deliberation.
111. Juror #20, in Clemons v. DiLieto, No. 14660 (D. Conn., filed Oct. 6, 1971) (de-
fendant's verdict) (emphasis in original).
112. Juror #63, in DelVecchio v. Dana, No. 15198 (D. Conn., filed July 20, 1972)
(plaintiff's verdict). In this case the judge charged that the search warrant was invalid
and violated the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
113. D. Naples, M. Malone, J. York. One juror stated that the trial "resolved itself
into the relative credibility of each side." Juror #39, in Bell v. White, No. 14836 (D.
Conn., filed Jan. 10, 1972) (defendant's verdict).
114. Newman, supra note 3, at 464.
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than as a prejudice of jurors against plaintiffs.115 One attorney, who
had handled police misconduct cases as both a plaintiff's and a de-
fendant's advocate, thought that the "[p]olice come in with a big ad-
vantage. "116 Another explained metaphorically that "[n]o one likes to
think the Good Humor Man is a rapist."" 7 Several attorneys spoke of a
pro-police bias of "the man in the street" who has a natural sympathy
toward police officers. 118 An attorney who represented defendants said
he had an advantage because he "had the cops." He added, "[c]ops are
not inherently more credible; people want to support the police.""u 9
Another attorney said that "juries know misconduct goes on and feel
like it should go on more often."'12 0 Moreover, the attorneys' percep-
tions of juror bias in favor of police affected their handling of these
cases. One plaintiffs' attorney settled his police misconduct suits out of
court, for less than he settled his other cases, because he felt the police
had the edge in court.' 21 A defense attorney stated that he had little
inclination to settle police misconduct cases "if the defendants' posi-
tion is at all respectable, because the jury is law enforcement
oriented." 1
22
2. The Good Faith Defense
One of the most discussed legal concepts in section 1983 police mis-
conduct litigation is the good faith defense. 23 By proving that he
115. Thirty-three of the 40 attorneys interviewed expressed an opinion on juror bias.
Twenty-four said that jurors were biased in favor of the police; 22 characterized the bias
as being against the plaintiffs. Defendants' attorneys as well as plaintiffs' attorneys pointed
to jury bias: statements by defendants' attorneys that juries are biased in favor of their
client are not self-serving, for they neither add prestige to their victories nor explain
their defeats. Six attorneys (three plaintiffs' attorneys, two defendants' attorneys, and one
mixed attorney) responded that there is only pro-police bias. P. Belmont, P. Branford, P.
Calhoun, D. George, D. Kavanaugh, M. Edwards. Four attorneys (one plaintiffs' attorney
and three defendants' attorneys) responded that there is only bias against the plaintiff. P.
Saybrook, D. Arcadia, D. Dwight, D. Moore. Eighteen other attorneys (eight plaintiffs'
attorneys, seven defendants' attorneys, and three mixed attorneys) noted both pro-police
and antiplaintiff biases. P. Broadway, P. Davenport, P. Gypsy, P. Rudy, P. Sherman, P.
Silliman, P. Stiles, P. Trumbull, D. Delmonico, D. England, D. Leon, D. Naples, D. Ox-
ford, D. Pierson, D. Wilfred, H. Blake, M. Foundry, M. Malone.
Four attorneys stated that juries were not biased in favor of or against either side. D.
Chao, D. Clark, D. Lad, D. Zapata. Another attorney pointed to bias against the defen-
dant. D. Berkeley.
This classification does not distinguish between attorneys who declared their conclu-
sions of jury bias and attorneys whose responses strongly imply such conclusions.
116. M. Blake.
117. D. England.





123. E.g., Nahmod, supra note 22, at 26; Comment, supra note 12, at 951-53.
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believed in good faith that his actions were lawful, and that such belief
was reasonable, a police defendant can avoid liability for actions that
would otherwise violate a citizen's constitutional rights. 12 4 The defense
has been criticized because its logic is self-contained and circular12 5
Additionally, it has been argued that the jury misapplies the defense by
focusing on the subjective good faith of the police officer and ignoring
the objective standard of reasonableness. 126 The defense thus becomes
the means through which jurors, already inclined to favor police de-
fendants, express their bias.1
27
The Project attempted to determine whether the jurors correctly
understood and applied the good faith defense:128 Attorneys were also
questioned about the defense and its effect on jurors. 12 9 On the basis
of this examination, it was determined that the good faith defense was
far less important to the outcome of the jury trials than was anticipated.
Moreover, the jurors' comprehension of the defense could not be de-
termined from the data.
The good faith defense was of limited significance for three reasons:
the jurors did not remember it; many attorneys either did not under-
stand it or were not aware of it; and the defense was not charged in
124. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1348 (2d Cir. 1972).
125. Newman, supra note 3, at 460. For example, the plaintiff's cause of action for a
false arrest requires him to show that the arrest was not reasonably based on probable
cause. If the officer reasonably believed that he had probable cause to make the unlawful
arrest, then he is exonerated because of the good faith defense. But, as Judge Newman
points out, "[s]urely the officer could not reasonably believe that there was probable cause
for an unlawful arrest, for an unlawful arrest is by definition an arrest for which a
prudent police officer could not reasonably believe there was probable cause." Id. (em-
phasis in original).
126. Theis, supra note 12, at 1009-12; P. Davenport ("If police [officer convinces] the
jury that he believed he acted right to do what he did, even if [it is] absurd, then he
wins.")
127. P. Sherman (defense allows jurors "to vote their hearts, not their heads"); M.
Blake ("They are leaning toward the police already. If they hear 'good faith' that may be
all they need to vote their leaning."); M. Foundry ("[The defense provides the) jury a
comfortable way to say 'yes, the defendant did something wrong, but he does not to have
to pay. .... 'Subjective' may be three-fourths of the test in the jurors' minds.")
128. A series of questions was designed to test the jurors' knowledge of the doctrine,
and to discover how it influenced their deliberations:
Appendix 2, question 13: There is a doctrine, sometimes called the good faith de-
fense, which says that if a police officer believed, in good faith, that his conduct was
lawful and if his belief was reasonable, then he is not liable for his actions. (a) Was
this doctrine mentioned by the judge? (b) Did you feel that this doctrine was ade-
quately explained by the judge? (c) Did this doctrine affect your verdict? (d) How
did this doctrine affect your verdict? (e) Please write in the space below the reason
why the doctrine affected your verdict this way.
Appendix 2, question 9: Did the police officer think his actions were reasonable?
Regardless of what the police officer thought, did you think his actions were reason-
able?
129. See Appendix 1, questions 15-18.
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some of the cases in the sample. Despite an explanation of the good
faith defense in the questionnaire, only six jurors remembered that
the defense had been mentioned by the judge. 130 This lack of recollec-
tion contrasts sharply with the jurors' ability to remember such details
as the amount of damages they awarded and the plaintiff's lifestyle. 13 1
This comparison suggests that the good faith defense had little impact
on the jurors' verdicts.
The attorneys also displayed a surprising lack of knowledge about
the defense.'3 2 Even attorneys who said the defense was important 133
frequently needed prompting on its operation. Answers tended to be
vague and, in contrast to other answers, rarely referred to specific cases
for illustration.134 Finally, the importance of the defense was severely
diminished because the judge did not charge it in at least eight of the
jury cases in the Project sample. 135
130. Only two of the six answers were capable of verification. See p. 805 infra. One
juror remembered that the good faith defense was charged by the judge; however, a sec-
ond juror who sat on the same trial remembered that the defense was not charged. That
trial resulted in a hung jury; on retrial the good faith defense was not mentioned. Court
File, Clemons v. DiLieto, No. 14660 (D. Conn., filed Oct. 6, 1971). This raises additional
doubts about the accuracy of jurors' memories regarding the good faith defense.
131. E.g., Juror #85, in Williams v. DiLieto, No. 15646 (D. Conn., filed Feb. 28,
1973) (remembered that award was for $1366); Juror #39, in Bell v. White, No. 14836
(D. Conn., filed Jan. 10, 1972) (described plaintiff's lifestyle in terms of residence and
friends).
132. Thirty percent of the attorneys either did not know what the defense was or had
not used it. Thus, when questioned about the importance of the defense, see Appendix I,
question 15, three attorneys admitted they were unfamiliar with it. D. Griswold, D.
Kavanaugh, M. Edwards. Another four attorneys stated that the defense was never an
issue in their cases, although it is not clear whether this was because the defense was
legally not applicable, see note 135 infra, or because they were ignorant of the doctrine.
P. deVille, D. Consiglio, D. Oxford, M. Malone. Three attorneys did not answer the
question. P. Belmont, P. Trumbull, D. Millpond. One defense attorney who had repre-
sented police officers in numerous cases "never pleaded" the good faith defense. D.
Berkeley. Finally, one attorney displayed an obvious lack of comprehension: "Yes, it's im-
portant; the good faith of [the plaintiff] is an issue." P. Garden.
133. Twenty-two attorneys believed the good faith defense was important. P. Bran-
ford, P. Broadway, P. Calhoun, P. Davenport, P. Rudy, P. Sherman, P. Silliman, D.
Arcadia, D. Chao, D. Clark, D. Delmonico, D. Dwight, D. England, D. Kaysey, D. Lad,
D. Leon, D. Moore, D. Pierson, D. Wilfred, D. Zapata, M. Blake, M. Foundry. The number
of "important" responses may have been inflated somewhat by prompting. Six attorneys
did not think the defense was important. P. Fitzwilly, P. Gypsy, P. Saybrook, P. Stiles, D.
George, D. Naples.
134. E.g., D. Lad ("Any defense you have is important.")
135. The data indicate that the good faith defense was charged by the judge in six
cases and not charged in eight cases. In 10 cases it cannot be determined whether the
defense was charged.
From interrogatories to the jury it was clear that the good faith defense was not
charged in three trials. Court File, James v. DiLieto, No. N-74-247 (D. Conn., filed Oct.
21, 1974); Court File, Davis v. Gianotti, No. 15157 (D. Conn., filed July 6, 1972); Court
File, Clemons v. DiLieto, No. 14660 (D. Conn., filed Oct. 6, 1971). One judge, as a matter
of policy, does not charge the good faith defense in excessive force cases. This judge
presided over five excessive force trials in the sample. Court File, Acampora v. D'Urso, No.
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The data on jurors' comprehension of the good faith defense are
inconclusive. On the one hand, the majority of jurors did not remember
if the judge had mentioned the defense.136 On the other hand, in one
case two jurors remembered that the defense had been charged and
they seem to have applied it correctly. 137 Also, questions that probed
the juror's attitude about the objective and subjective reasonableness
of the defendant's actions were answered by the majority of jurors in
a manner consistent with their verdicts.138 The jurors thus showed
themselves capable of making the distinction between subjective and
objective reasonableness. Nevertheless, because of their inability to
remember if such a distinction was made during their deliberations, it
is impossible to determine if the jurors understood the good faith de-
fense at the time of trial.
N-75-134 (D. Conn., filed May 23, 1975); Court File, Gaddy ex rel. Jackson v. Gaglione,
No. N-75-97 (D. Conn., filed Apr. 7, 1975); Court File, Worrell v. Downs, No. N-75-83 (D.
Conn., filed Mar. 27, 1975); Court File, Trent v. Summa, No. N-75-55 (D. Conn., filed
Mar. 3, 1975); Court File, Guest v. Homer, No. 15257 (D. Conn., filed Aug. 15, 1972).
Although it is not known whether the defense was charged in 10 trials, the data
demonstrate that the jury was instructed on the good faith defense in six others. Court
File, Burns v. Celentano, No. 15469 (D. Conn., filed Nov. 28, 1972); Court File, Delecke
ex rel. Delecke v. Tsolis, No. 15244 (D. Conn., filed Aug. 10, 1972); Court File, DelVecchio
v. Dana, No. 15198 (D. Conn., filed July 20, 1972); Court File, McEachern v. Consiglio, No.
14908 (D. Conn., filed Feb. 23, 1972); Court File, Martin v. Consiglio, No. 14741 (D. Conn.,
filed Nov. 19, 1971); Court File, Ramos v. DiLieto, No. 14652 (D. Conn., filed Sept. 30,
1971); Court File, Gray v. DiLieto, No. 14640 (D. Conn., filed Sept. 21, 1971); Court File,
Smith v. DiLieto, No. 14624 (D. Conn., filed Sept. 15, 1971).
136. In answer to the question, "Was this doctrine mentioned by the judge?," six jurors
answered "yes," 11 jurors answered "no," and 52 jurors answered "I do not remember."
See Appendix 2, question 13.
137. Juror #62, in DelVecchio v. Dana, No. 15198 (D. Conn., filed July 20, 1972) ("The
police officer in clear conscionse, and he should have received proper training in entering
someones' home, could not say that he 'believed in good faith' that what he did was
right.") A second juror found the defendant's assertion of good faith unreasonable:
It was explained that Officer Dana had several training courses dealing in serving of
search warrants. He had served several hundred but he failed to note that the warrant
contained only general statements of material to be found. Search warrants must list
the exact items to be stolen. He should have known this.
Juror #64, in DelVecchio v. Dana, No. 15198 (D. Conn., filed July 20, 1972).
In DelVecchio, the plaintiff alleged an unlawful search and the judge charged the jury
that the defendant's search warrant was illegal on its face. Court File, DelVecchio v. Dana,
No. 15198 (D. Conn., filed July 20, 1972). Evidence at trial showed that the police officer
had altered the search warrant after the search in order to make it appear legal. Because
the judge had charged that the warrant was illegal, the only question the jury was left to
decide was whether the police officer was absolved of liability because he had proved the
elements of the good faith defense. The defendant was found liable.
138. Only three of 54 answers were inconsistent with the verdict. The juror should
have voted to acquit the defendant if he thought that the defendant's actions were ob-
jectively reasonable. The juror should have found the defendant liable if the police
officer's actions were not objectively reasonable. See Appendix 2, question 9.
All of the 70 jurors who responded believed that the police officer thought his actions
were legal. Two jurors stated that the defendant's actions were unreasonable, yet rendered
a verdict for the defense. Only one juror who thought that the police officer's actions
were reasonable nevertheless rendered a verdict for the plaintiff.
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Significant bias in favor of the police officers, then, was indicated by
the comments of jurors and was confirmed by attorneys. The biases of
jurors varied in strength, from outright prejudice to more subtle pre-
sumptions, often equally damaging to the plaintiff's case. Whether the
"good faith" defense intensified pro-police biases could not be de-
termined from the data; but, in any event, the defense seemed to have
little effect on the outcomes of the studied trials.
C. Bias Inherent in the Jury Selection Process
The Project data also reveal two serious problems of bias inherent
in the jury selection procedure used in the section 1983 cases studied.
First, blacks were seriously underrepresented on the juries; second, a
large percentage of the jurors sat on more than one police misconduct
trial, often within a short period of time.
1. Scarcity of Black Jurors
In the Project's sample of jury trials, blacks occupied only two of the
163 juror positions.139 Jurors are chosen from the list of registered voters
in the territorial area of the court division. 140 Blacks do not register to
vote in the same proportions as do whites, and thus fewer are included
on the juror lists.1 4 ' In addition, the area of the New Haven Division
includes many suburban towns that have relatively small black popula-
tions.' 42 Some defense attorneys frankly stated that they prefer all-white
139. The court records do not include a separate category "Hispanic" under ethnic
classification. Hispanics, therefore, are included in the classification "white."
140. In the District of Connecticut, the first step in selecting jurors is to pick a Master
Jury Wheel by choosing at random one percent of the registered voters in each political
subdivision lying within the Division. When jurors are needed, names are drawn by lot
from the Master Jury Wheel. These people are sent a juror qualification form. Those
who complete the form and are not excused for cause make up the Qualified Jury Wheel
from which names are drawn randomly to make up jury panels. When presented with a
panel, attorneys listen to the voir dire conducted by the judge. Afterwards they may
challenge panel members for cause and exercise their peremptory challenges. The remain-
ing panel members compose the petit jury. See D. CONN. JuRY SELECTION PLAN (promul-
gated Sept. 23, 1968; amended June 10, 1975).
141. See United States v. Jenkins, 496 F.2d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 1974):
The percentage of Negroes among the adult population (i.e. aged 21 years or older)
in the New Haven division is 5.45%, according to the United States Census. On the
other hand, questionnaires sent out to members of the New Haven division jury pools
from 1969 to 1973 revealed that only 3.3% were Negroes.
Cf. AMmuA N JURY SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 22 (voter registration lists do not represent
cross-section of population).
142. P. Broadway, P. Davenport, P. Sherman, M. Foundry, M. Malone.
In the most recent update of the Qualified Jury Wheel in the New Haven Division,
1000 people were sent juror qualification forms. Of the 1000 persons, 809 responded; 15
of these, or less than two percent, were "nonwhite." Interview with Frances Consiglio,
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juries; 143 when only one or two blacks appear on a basic panel of thirty
from which a jury of six is to be chosen, such an attorney can easily
eliminate the black jurors through peremptory challenges.'44
The two black jurors in the Project sample sat on different trials;
these were the only two trials that resulted in hung juries.145 Although
such an occurrence can be explained as a coincidence, the inference
might be drawn that the presence of black jurors makes consensus more
difficult because it inhibits the operation of racial prejudice or other
antiplaintiff or pro-police biases. One juror, who sat on a hung jury,
supported this inference with his comment that "8 people with dif-
ferent back rounds, lifestyles and seeing and hearing the evidence
differently could not agree on the facts or lack of facts to convict the
defendants." 4 0
The same explanation was offered by a juror from the other hung
jury: "Considering the evidence presented by both sides I had no
trouble in making up my mind. For what its worth-I felt we were
hung because of our lifestyles and our own dealings with the police-
good-bad or indifferent."'147 Because the participants in the delibera-
Assistant Clerk of Court, New Haven Division (May 2, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Consiglio
Interview].
These figures contrast markedly with statistics compiled by the Census Bureau. The
population of Connecticut in 1970 was 6.5% "Negro and other races," as opposed to
"white." The counties of Middlesex, New Haven, and New London, which comprise the
New Haven Division, contain 114,816, 744,948, and 230,348 persons, respectively. The
percentages of "Negro and other races" in their populations are 3.2%, 8.1%, and
4.0%, respectively. Thus, a weighted average of the "Negro and other races" popula-
tion in the counties is 6.7%. 1 BUREAU OF CENSUS, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATISTICS AD-
MINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION pt 8, ch. B, at
35-37 & Table 16. "Negroes" preponderate the category "Negro and other races": in 1970
there were in Connecticut 3,031,709 persons, of whom 2.835,458 were white, 181,177 were
Negro, 2,222 were Indian, 1,621 were Japanese, 2,209 were Chinese, 2,177 were Filipino,
and 6,845 fit none of the above categories. Id. at 38 Table 17.
143. One defense attorney explained that "You pick all white juries; pick business
types concerned about security; working class types concerned about street crime." D.
Naples; accord, D. Dwight (desired older, male, white jurors); D. Zapata ("right kind of
jury" was one with middle-class, suburban, white members).
144. See AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 24-25; cf. United States v. Newman,
549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977) (mandamus granted to vacate district court's disallowance of
peremptory challenges used by Government to eliminate all four black venireman be-
cause Government exhibited pattern of excessive challenges against blacks).
145. Court File, Penque v. Runlett, No. N-74-237 (D. Conn., filed Oct. 11, 1974) (white
plaintiff); Court File, Clemons v. DiLieto, No. 14660 (D. Conn., filed Oct. 6, 1971) (black
plaintiff; defendant's verdict).
146. Juror #10, in Clemons v. DiLieto, No. 14660 (D. Conn., filed Oct. 6, 1971).
147. Juror #115, in Penque v. Runlett, No. N-74-237 (D. Conn. filed Oct. 11, 1974). A
juror in another case suggested that black jurors would have added a different perspective:
I seriously question the ability of anyone juror no matter how concientious, to remain
impartial and logical in a case where it is possible to follow prejudice or try to
counteract it. Either way the scales are not balanced .... Better legal guidelines would
have softened the uneasiness felt about this case as would several black jurors.
Juror #15, in Clemons v. DiLieto, No. 14660 (D. Conn., filed OcL 6, 1971) (black plain-
tiff; defendant's verdict).
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tions explain their inability to reach a verdict as a function of different
lifestyles, backgrounds, and dealings with the police, and because de-
fense attorneys concede that they prefer all-white, middle-class juries,
it is clear that a jury selection process that regularly includes few
blacks systematically discriminates in favor of defendants in police
misconduct suits.
2. Repeat Jurors
It was not unusual for a juror to sit on more than one police mis-
conduct case because many petit juries are chosen from the same pool
of veniremen. 148 Of the 163 juror positions in the studied cases, thirty-
nine (approximately twenty-five percent) were filled by jurors who had
already deliberated on at least one police misconduct trial. One juror
sat on four police misconduct trials, six sat on three, and twenty-four
sat on two.
The plaintiffs did not fare well in the trials in which repeat jurors
deliberated. In the ten trials in which the jury included more than one
person who had previously been a juror in a police misconduct case, no
plaintiff was successful.' 49 At times, jurors sat on police misconduct
cases in which the parties were represented by the same attorneys they
had witnessed before.a5° Three attorneys volunteered, without being
148. For example, several police misconduct cases may be docketed for trial during a
certain month. The juries for these and other trials may be chosen on one day at the
beginning of the month. Typically, about 100 veniremen are summoned to appear on
that day; from the veniremen, panels, usually consisting of 30 persons, are chosen at
random. From a panel, attorneys choose the petit jury. After a panel member has been
chosen as a juror, he reenters the the pool of veniremen, from which he may again be
chosen to serve on a panel and, possibly, to become a juror in another trial. See Consiglio
Interview, supra note 142.
149. The following table, which excludes the two deadlocked juries, shows the rela-
tionship between the number of repeat jurors and the outcome of the trial.
Table A: Repeat Jurors
Number of repeat jurors Outcome of trial









150. For example, four members of the jury in Abramovitz v. DiLieto, No. N-74-248
(D. Conn., filed Oct. 21, 1974), were also members of the jury in Gaddy ex rel. Jackson
v. Gaglione, No. N-75-97 (D. Conn., filed Apr. 7, 1975). Two of these four jurors together
with two other jurors from the Abramovitz trial, served on a third jury, in Acampora v.
D'Urso, No. N-75-134 (D. Conn., filed May 23, 1975). These three cases, all with defendants'
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asked, that the existence of repeat jurors in police misconduct cases is
highly prejudicial to the plaintiff.151 It is not apparent why repeat
jurors affect the outcome of a trial; but it is clear that their presence,
for whatever reasons, benefits the defendants. 15 2
II. Effect on Defendants of Police Misconduct Suits
The purpose of section 1983 suits against the police is both to com-
pensate individuals for violations of their constitutional rights and to
deter police misconduct.153 If the deterrent effect depends chiefly upon
holding those who are responsible for the misconduct financially ac-
countable,15 4 then it is essential to know who bears the costs of these
verdicts, involved plaintiffs represented by the same attorney, as well as defendants from
the same municipality, represented by the Office of the Corporation Counsel.
Repeated appearances of plaintiffs' attorneys may have induced jurors to conclude that
the plaintiffs' attorneys were soliciting clients or were bringing actions of doubtful merit.
If so, such a conclusion could have caused jurors to disfavor the plaintiffs' claims. The
comments of two jurors may illustrate such a prejudice:
This case should never have gone to trial in my opinion. It represents a waste of time
and money, because there seemed to be no evidence of misconduct on the part of the
policeman .... I noticed that the plaintiff's lawyer, Mr - , was also involved
in a series of cases of alleged police misconduct.
Juror #127, in Abramovitz v. DiLieto, No. N-74-248 (D. Conn., filed Oct. 21, 1974)
(attorney name withheld);
I felt that the plaintiff's case was blown out of proportion (both by the attorney and
the plaintiff's). Too many cases are brought to trial and waste of people's time and
money-because somebody's feelings were hurt. People feel they are entitled to a lot
of money (attornies & judges do not help in this cause).
Juror #159, in Acampora v. D'Urso, No. N-75-134 (D. Conn., filed May 23, 1975). The
first juror expressed dislike for the plaintiff's attorney; the second juror answered that
he was "neutral."
151. One attorney said that the juries were "lousy" because one plaintiffs' attorney
"brings too many cases," and when the jurors see those cases they "start to compare." He
added that such comparison made his job "harder." P. Branford. "In federal court the
same jurors sit on some of the § 1983 cases. This is terrible. Jurors then can't handle each
case individually." M. Blake; see D. Arcadia (jury selection procedure favors defendant).
152. It is possible that jurors hearing their first police misconduct trial may be able
to control their prejudices somewhat; but by the time of the second, third, or fourth
such trial, the jurors may have greater difficulty. For jurors who share a pro-police bias,
it probably is easier to admit that an isolated incident of misconduct could occur than to
acknowledge a series of such events. Also, to the extent that a juror feels threatened by
the persons who are plaintiffs in these suits, the juror may become more sympathetic to
the view that one cannot expect niceties from law enforcement officers who are con-
stantly exposed to threatening individuals.
153. Nahmod, supra note 22, at 10-11; Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and
Federalism, 90 HARv. L. Rxv. 1133, 1226-27 (1977).
154. The deterrent effect of police misconduct suits may not depend exclusively on
the individual suffering a financial loss; a lawsuit also may lead to emotional stress,
adverse publicity, and detrimental effects on the officer's career. D. Oxford, P. Belmont.
Some officers, because they were deemed violent or troublemakers, were given assignments
with little public exposure. D. Oxford, P. Branford.
One police chief explained that the allegations embodied in a complaint alleging
brutality or illegal search are news, and often are given front-page treatment by the
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suits. The Project data, however, indicate that both the individual
defendants and the police departments are insulated from any financial
burden consequent to a section 1983 suit.
A. Effect on Individual Officers
In the sample cases, municipalities'55 were not liable under section
1983 for the unconstitutional actions of their employees. 15 Nonethe-
less, police officers were provided free legal counsel'5 7 and were in-
demnified for any settlement or judgment by the municipality or its
insurance carrier.'58 Some of the municipalities in the sample were
self-insured; 59 others purchased insurance from a carrier for the bene-
media. 0. Mara; see P. Branford, D. Arcadia, D. Naples. The subsequent disposition of
the case, be it a defense verdict or an out-of-court settlement at a nominal sum, comes
years later without publicity. 0. Mara.
In Connecticut, the defendant's house, under certain circumstances, can be attached
as security for a judgment against him. See FED. R. Civ. P. 64 (in absence of federal law,
state law governs attachment); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-279 (1977) (attachment of police
officer's property allowed if he has been dismissed from police force or if judicial order
is obtained). One plaintiffs' attorney admitted that an attachment motion can be made for
its psychological effect, and not to secure a judgment, which in any event will be paid by
the city or insurance company. M. Foundry; see R. SULNICK, supra note 17, at 93 (em-
pirical study concluding that civil litigation has effect to extent that superior officers feel
stigmatized by successful suits and are aware that departmental funds are significantly
reduced).
155. The following is a list of the municipalities that had police officers sued in
the sample cases; the number of suits involving each municipality and the Connecticut
State Police is given parenthetically: New Haven (71), West Haven (19), Hartford (13),
State Police (7), Waterbury (6), Hamden (5), Madison (4), East Haven (3), Naugatuck (3),
Branford (2), Bridgeport (2), Milford (2), Ansonia (1), Cheshire (1), Meriden (1), Middle-
bury (1), Middletown (1), North Branford (I), North Haven (1), Seymour (1), Torrington
(1), West Hartford (1), Willimantic (I), and Woodbridge (1).
156. See p. 785 supra.
157. D. Arcadia, D. Berkeley, D. Chao, D. Clark, D. Dwight, D. England, D. George,
D. Kaysey, D. Lad, D. Naples, M. Edwards.
158. Five juries awarded monetary damages in seven cases, including three awards in
a consolidated trial. One verdict was against an employee of the Madison Police Depart-
ment, Court File, DelVecchio v. Dana, No. 15198 (D. Conn., filed July 20, 1972), but the
judgment was paid by the town of Madison. Interviews with attorneys of the parties
(names withheld). Six verdicts were against employees of the New Haven Police Depart-
ment. Court File, Williams v. DiLieto, No. 15646 (D. Conn., filed Feb. 28, 1973); Court
File, Delecke ex rel. Delecke v. Tsolis, No. 15244 (D. Conn., filed Aug. 10, 1972); Court
File, Martin v. Consiglio, No. 14741 (D. Conn., filed Nov. 19, 1971); Court File, Ramos v.
DiLieto, No. 14652 (D. Conn., filed Sept. 30, 1971); Court File, Gray v. DiLieto, No. 14640
(D. Conn., filed Sept. 21, 1971); Court File, Smith v. DiLieto, No. 14624 (D. Conn., filed
Sept. 15, 1971). In each case, the judgments, including one punitive damage award, were
paid by the City of New Haven. Interview with attorneys of the parties (names withheld).
Forty-two of the studied cases were concluded by a stipulated dismissal, that is, a
settlement out of court. Through interviews with attorneys it was possible to collect
settlement figures for 32 of these suits. With one exception, attorneys who supplied these
damage figures could point to no case in which the individual officer ultimately bore the
cost of the settlement. For an explanation of the exception, see p. 811 infra.
159. Three of the larger municipalities in the study-Bridgeport, New Haven, and
Waterbury-were self-insured because premiums were expensive in urban areas. D.
Arcadia, D. Berkeley, D. Chao, D. Kaysey.
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fit of their employees. °60 Once a complaint was filed against an officer,
the insurance company was notified, and it retained an attorney to
represent the police officer.' 6 ' If the municipality was self-insured, its
corporation counsel handled the police officer's defense.
162
The individual defendants were almost always indemnified even
though both the municipality and the insurance carrier retain the right
not to reimburse the police officer if the misconduct was willful,
wanton, or outside the scope of the officer's duties.' 63 The importance
of this right was stressed by a number of attorneys. 6 4 Nevertheless,
there were only two instances in which the right was exercised: one
case resulted in the officer paying twenty-five dollars, 65 and the other,
involving an off-duty officer, was pending at the conclusion of the field
research.'60 Even in the one case in which a jury awarded punitive
damages against a police officer, the municipality indemnified the
officer for both the compensatory and punitive portions of the award.
6 7
Moreover, no supervisory official in the sample suffered an adverse
judgment at trial.'68 Not only were they never found liable, they were
rarely even defendants at trial. Supervisory officials were sued in
160. East Haven, Hartford, Madison, Milford, Naugatuck, and West Haven purchased
insurance. D. Clark, D. Consiglio, D. Lad, D. Leon, D. Pierson, M. Edwards.
161. See, e.g., D. Dwight, D. England.
162. See, e.g., D. Chao, D. Naples. In a few cases with multiple defendants, the corpora-
tion counsel retained private attorneys to represent individual defendants, thus avoiding
a conflict of interest. E.g., Court File, Smith v. DiLieto, No. 14624 (D. Conn., filed Sept.
15, 1971).
163. The Connecticut indemnity statute, in relevant part, states:
Any town, city or borough .... shall pay on behalf of any employee of such munici-
pality,... all sums which such employee becomes obligated to pay by reason of the
liability imposed upon such employee by law for damages awarded for infringement
of any person's civil rights or for physical damages to person or property . . . if
the employee,... was acting in the performance of his duties and within the scope
of his employment, and if such occurrence, accident, physical injury or damage was
not the result of any wilful or wanton act of such employee in the discharge of such
duty.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-465 (1977). The statute embodies the policy that a person may not
insure against losses caused by his intentional wrongs. See Messersmith v. American
Fidelity Co., 232 N.Y. 161, 165, 133 N.E. 432, 433 (1921) (Cardozo, J.) ("[Njo one shall be
permitted to take advantage of his own wrong .... )
164. D. Arcadia, D. Berkeley, D. Clark, D. Dwight, D. Kaysey, D. Leon, D. Naples, D.
Wilfred, M. Edwards.
165. The total settlement was $425; the $25 payment was made pursuant to an agree-
ment providing that the settlement would be paid jointly by the officer, the municipality,
and the insurance company. The officer, who was in bankruptcy proceedings at the time,
paid $25 in order to be released from liability. Interview with attorney of a party (case
and attorney name withheld).
166. Court File, Gifford v. Rodriguez, No. N-76-157 (D. Conn., filed May 17, 1976).
167. Court File, Delecke ex rel. Delecke v. Tsolis, No. 15244 (D. Conn., filed Aug. 10,
1972).
168. None of the seven plaintiffs' verdicts was against supervisory officials. See note
158 supra (plaintiffs' verdicts).
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eighty-two separate cases; in all but nine, the officials were dismissed
as defendants before trial.1 9
Thus, in almost every case, the individual defendant suffered no
financial loss because of the suits. If deterrence is predicated upon a
police officer being personally accountable in damages to his victim,
then there is no example of deterrence in the Project sample.
B. Effect on Police Departments
There were few changes in police department practices as a result
of the section 1983 suits in the Project sample. The only changes in
police procedures directly attributable to the suits were the adoption
by the Willimantic police department of detailed regulations defining
proper police conduct, 170 the institution by the New Haven Police
Department of more accurate and extensive police reports,' 7 ' and the
prohibition of retaliatory arrests of citizens who filed complaints with
the New Haven Police Department about an officer's conduct.172 No
169. In seven of the nine cases in which supervisory officials were still defendants at
trial, they won directed verdicts; in the other two instances the jury found them not
liable. This excludes instances in which superiors were kept in the suit in their official
capacities only to serve as necessary defendants for purposes of injunctive relief. See note
21 supra.
170. Court File, Hernandez v. Noel, No. 13940 (D. Conn., filed July 13, 1970). The
change in regulations resulted from a class action suit brought on behalf of all residents
of Willimantic who were of Puerto Rican ancestry and who had been victims of alleged
harassment, intimidation, discrimination, and violent conduct by Willimantic police of-
ficers. Alleged misconduct included, inter alia, wrongful discharge of firearms, beatings,
and false arrests. Instead of money damages, the plaintiffs sought only injunctive relief
ordering the discontinuance of these improper actions. Id.
The suit was withdrawn with the filing of a six-paragraph stipulation with the court.
The stipulation stated that a new police chief had been appointed, that detailed regula-
tions defining proper police conduct had been adopted, that there was to be psychological
testing of recruits, and that no admission as to the merits of the complaint was to be
implied. Id.
171. In the consolidated trial of the Cocaine-Quinine cases, which resulted in three
plaintiffs' verdicts, there was testimony that police informants fabricated claims and that
police officers filed false case incident reports. Monetary damages were awarded, and a
consent decree was authorized, which provided that the reports were to be signed under
penalties provided by state law for making a false statement, and that better records of
informants were to be kept, including an assessment of their reliability, and of the money
paid to them. Court File, Ramos v. DiLieto, No. 14652 (D. Conn., filed Sept. 30, 1971);
Court File, Gray v. DiLieto, No. 14640 (D. Conn., filed Sept. 21, 1971); Court File, Smith
v. DiLieto, No. 14624 (D. Conn., filed Sept. 15, 1971).
172. Court File, McCue v. Spencer, No. N-75-145 (D. Conn., filed May 30, 1975). The
action was brought by tilaintiffs who were arrested in an incident at the New Haven
Coliseum. The prosecutor entered a nolle prosequi for the charges the next day and the
plaintiffs made a complaint to the police department. Subsequently, a new warrant was
procured for the plaintiffs' arrest; when one of the plaintiffs returned to the police
station to complete a written report upon the request of the defendants, the plaintiff was
rearrested. Id.
The case was settled on the following terms: "ITThe defendants would pay the plaintiffs
Suing the Police
injunctions ordering changes in police procedures were issued in any
case in the sample.'1
73
Payments made by municipalities as a result of section 1983 litiga-
tion did not generate pressure on the police departments to minimize
misconduct. 74 Damage awards were infrequent and diminutive; suits
were often settled out of court for modest sums. 1 75 The costs that did
exist were hidden; for example, legal work was done by salaried at-
torneys in the office of the corporation counsel, or by an insurance
company as part of the municipality's comprehensive liability in-
surance coverage.
176
The lack of significant monetary incentive was combined with a
disinclination on the part of some municipalities to discipline their
police. Whether because municipal officials were generally sympa-
thetic toward police officers, or because they were dependent politically
on the police department, or simply because the plaintiffs in these
suits were not members of a politically significant constituency, the
attitude of municipal leaders often appeared to be one of complete
support for law enforcement agencies. 177 In one striking illustration
of solidarity with the police department, a municipal board of police
commissioners decided against disciplining a police officer who had
been found liable for his use of excessive force and subsequently
promoted him.178 In another case, after a police officer had been con-
victed on criminal charges of brutality and had been given a suspended
sentence, the mayor proclaimed that the officer would neither be
disciplined nor miss a day's work.'7 9
a total of $2000.00 and the defendant DiLieto would send a letter to the members of the
New Haven Police Department instructing them on certain procedures which would as-
sure that the misconduct demonstrated in the captioned case would not again occur."
Id.
173. Some attorneys said, however, these suits may have contributed to several changes
in police practices. Officers in some police departments receive more extensive training
now than in the past. D. Clark, D. England, D. Kavanaugh. In addition, legal advisors
now review search warrants, D. Clark, D. England; but one attorney asserted that this
procedure was instituted in order to increase the conviction rate. P. Calhoun. Finally, two
departments have instituted stricter firearms procedures. P. Davenport, P. Trumbull. On
the other hand, several defense attorneys did not think that § 1983 suits caused or
contributed to any changes in police practices. D. Berkeley, D. Chao, D. George.
174. Thirteen attorneys said that the municipalities that had made payments did not
pressure their police departments to minimize police misconduct. D. Arcadia, D. Chao, D.
Delmonico, D. Dwight, D. England, D. George, D. Kavanaugh, D. Kaysey, D. Leon, D.
Moore, D. Naples, Mf. Blake, M. Edwards. Only one attorney said that some pressure might
exist. D. Pierson.
175. See p. 789 supra.
176. See p. 811 sutra.
177. P. Sherman, D. Chao, D. Clark, D. Dwight.
178. Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 155 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded sub nom.
City of W. Haven v. Turpin, 47 U.S.L.W. 3360 (U.S. Nov. 28, 1978) (en banc).
179. Weinstein, Long History of Police Misconduct in Bridgeport, C.C.L.U. NEws,
June 1978, at 2, col. 1.
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In some instances, even if municipal officials had tried, they probably
would have been powerless to effect changes in the police department.
For example, some attorneys pointed to the fact that one police chief
had established a political base independent of the mayor, thus in-
sulating the police department from outside influence.18 0 In that city
even the corporation counsel, ostensibly under the mayor's control, was
directed in the defense of police misconduct suits by the police chief.'81
In other instances, line officers have become more aggressive in pro-
tecting their own interests. 82 Police unions have taken increasingly
militant positions demanding protection of individual officers against
the threat of civil suits. 83 In view of the growing strength of the
unions,18 4 it has become politically expedient for the municipality to
accede to the demand for guaranteed indemnification against any loss
incurred in a suit. 85
Section 1983 suits thus had little impact on the police departments
in the Project sample. If deterrence is predicated on the municipality
taking action against the police department, then there was no example
of deterrence in the Project sample.
Conclusion
The Project's research documents that suits in the sample brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not compensate plaintiffs for violations of
their constitutional rights or deter police officers from engaging in
proscribed behavior. Plaintiffs who sued the police had to overcome
substantial impediments in order to receive redress, as the small num-
ber of successful plaintiffs indicates. The jurors disfavored plaintiffs
who were nonwhite or nonmiddle-class, or who had had previous
brushes with the law. The jurors favored police officers because they
were viewed as respectable people performing a difficult and necessary
job. These biases were enhanced by the juror selection process.
Both / the individual defendants and the police departments were
insulated from the financial burden consequent to a section 1983 suit.
180. P., Sherman, D. Delmonico, D. Oxford.
181. P. Sherman, D. Delmonico, D. Oxford.
182. D. Delmonico, M. Edwards. Two United States District Judges, J. Mory, J. York,
and two police chiefs, 0. Mara, 0. Pepe, emphasized the power of police unions.
183. D. Clark, 0. Mara; see 0. Pepe (union contract limits effects of § 1983 suits on
officers' careers); J. York (municipalities' supervisory power restricted because unions do
"too much managing").
184. Comment, Reviewing Civilian Complaints of Police Misconduct-Some Answers
and More Questions, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 89, 122 (1974); see Juris, The Implications of Police
Unionism, 6 LAw & Soc. Rlv. 231 (1971).
185. Two attorneys mentioned the practical political necessity for indemnification. See
D. Delmonico ("From a political point of view, we can't have police officers pay."); M.
Edwards (same).
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Supervisory officials were never found liable; line officers were in-
demnified for damage awards and settlement costs. The costs of the
suits were not high, and were often hidden, so that little incentive was
given the municipality to discipline the police. Political exigencies also
inhibited attempts by the municipality to control its police depart-
ment's behavior. Thus, if deterrence depends upon the imposition of
financial loss on the individual police officers, or upon the imposition
by municipalities of sanctions against the police department, these suits
did not deter police misconduct.
If the Project findings show jury bias, they presage no simple solu-
tion. However, the data do suggest several changes that would not
affect preexisting biases of jurors, but nevertheless would eliminate
several means by which these prejudices are enhanced. First, at the
very minimum, potential jurors should not be selected from voter
registration records alone.180 Lists of potential jurors should be aug-
mented by names from other sources that are more representative of
the total qualified population in the district. 8 7 With greater numbers
of blacks appearing on jury panels, more blacks might remain after
peremptory challenges to serve on juries.' The addition of black
jurors would promote broader deliberation and perhaps counteract
biases of other jurors.'8 9 Second, jurors who have deliberated on one
police misconduct case should not be allowed to sit on another during
their term of service. The exclusion of repeat jurors would eliminate a
class of jurors who, as the data have shown, consistently favored the
defendant.' 90 Third, the good faith defense should be eliminated from
police misconduct suits.' 9 ' To the extent that the doctrine affects jury
186. Each United States district court must adopt a plan to select juries in a random,
nondiscriminatory manner from a fair cross section of the community. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1861-1863 (1976). The statute explicitly permits the addition of names from sources
other than voter registration lists in order to eliminate discrimination and to obtain a
fair cross section of the community. Id. § 1863(b)(2).
187. A majority of the conferees in a recent study of juries recommended making juries
more representative by augmenting juror lists with names from driver's license records,
welfare rolls, telephone directories, or other such sources. AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM, supnra
note 7, at 22.
188. In districts with relatively small populations of blacks, augmentation of jury
lists, by itself, will not guarantee the inclusion of more blacks on juries. In the District
of Connecticut, for example, blacks comprise about six percent of the population. See
notes 141 & 142 supra. If a completely random sample were taken from the District's
population, the statistically expected number of blacks on a jury panel of 30 would be
fewer than two. An attorney who desired to exclude blacks from a jury, see p. 807
supra, could still do so, even though he might be forced to expend more of his peremptory
challenges.
189. See p. 807 sukra.
190. See pp. 808-09 suPra.
191. The good faith defense was imported from the common law into § 1983 by
judicial decision. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967); see note 11 supra. The defense
can be eliminated by judicial decision as well.
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verdicts, it is an added protection for the police officer who already
benefits from the biases of jurors.
192
Two further changes should be instituted in order to make section
1983 suits more effective. First, municipalities should be made strictly
liable for the unconstitutional acts of their police officers; second, the
individual officers should pay, without indemnification, for any puni-
tive damages awarded against them. Holding municipalities strictly
liable for the actions of their police officers would elevate the current
practice of indemnification to a legal standard. 93 The municipality's
liability would be limited to those instances in which the officer's
action is performed under color of state law, as prescribed by section
1983 itself.1
4
It is unfair and impractical to demand that before a municipality is
held liable, the plaintiff must show a causal link between a municipal
policy or custom and the act of the individual police officer.'9 The
192. Elimination of the good faith defense does not deny the defendant an op-
portunity to prove the reasonableness of his actions. Whether plaintiffs allege illegal
searches, false arrests, or uses of excessive force, the defendants' conduct is judged by a
standard of reasonableness. For example, to prove that he was falsely arrested, the plain-
tiff must show that, under the circumstances, a reasonably prudent officer did not have
probable cause to believe that the plaintiff committed a crime. See Henry v. United
States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959) (probable cause to arrest exists if officer reasonably be-
lieves crime has been committed); Martin v. Duffie, 463 F.2d 464, 468 (10th Cir. 1972)
(plaintiff has risk of nonpersuasion in § 1983 suit on issue of lack of probable cause to
arrest).
193. See pp. 810-11 supra.
194. The "under color of" provision in § 1983 was defined by the Supreme Court as
"[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184
(1961), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)
(quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). Thus, for example, the
municipality is not liable for the injuries inflicted by an unarmed, off-duty, out-of-
uniform police officer initiating a barroom brawl without pretense of authority. Cf.
Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438, 441 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 429 U.S. 118 (1976)
(liability under § 1983 of off-duty police officer for shooting plaintiffs with service revolver
while intervening in barroom dispute "pursuant to a duty imposed by police department
regulations"); Payne v. Government of Dist. of Columbia, 559 F.2d 809, 824 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (Tamm, J., concurring) (liability under § 1983 of off-duty, out-of-uniform police
officer for shooting while "attempting to investigate the possible theft of certain items
from his car").
195. For discussion of the applicable law, see note 20 supra. In this respect a police
misconduct suit is analogous to a products liability action. The requirement that a
plaintiff plead and prove an express or implied warranty before the manufacturer is held
liable has been rejected, in favor of a strict liability standard. The plaintiff must show
only that he was injured while using a product as it was intended to be used. Greenman
v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). Just as
the plaintiff's ability to prove reliance on a warranty, "an expensive, time-consuming,
and wasteful process," Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 112-
(1960), should not control a products liability case, an individual plaintiff's ability to
prove a causal link between a municipal custom and the unconstitutional act of a police
officer should not control a police misconduct case. The goals of a strict liability standard
in products liability cases are (1) to minimize danger to consumers, (2) to place the
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municipalities have the knowledge of police practices and the power
to change department policy; they should therefore be made respon-
sible to remedy the illegal activities of their employees.196 Furthermore,
the data have shown that even in instances in which the municipalities
themselves were arguably blameless, the individual police officers were
indemnified for their legal expenses as well as for settlement costs and
for damage awards.197 This policy insulates police officers from the
consequences of misconduct suits, and dictates that responsibility for
the unconstitutional actions of police employees lies with municipal-
ities.
The adoption of a standard of strict liability will ensure that damages
awarded to successful plaintiffs will be paid by "deep pocket" de-
fendants. 198 The costs of police misconduct thus will be borne by the
municipalities' citizens who are the beneficiaries of police protection. 19
Moreover, because juries would be aware of the municipal "deep
pockets," reluctance to find liability or to award fully compensatory
damages against individual police officers might diminish. More, and
burden of loss on the manufacturer, who can best minimize the danger, and (3) to
distribute the losses equitably among the consuming public, as a cost of doing business. 2
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.16, at 1571 (1956). The goals of a strict
liability standard in police misconduct cases are comparable: (1) to minimize unconstitu-
tional acts, (2) to place costs on the municipality, which can deter unconstitutional acts,
and (3) to distribute the losses equitably among the citizens of the municipality, who are
the beneficiaries of police protection.
196. Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 165 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded sub nor.
City of IV. Haven v. Turpin, 47 U.S.L.W. 3360 (U.S. Nov. 28, 1978) (en banc) (munici-
pality arguably in best position to reduce misconduct); Hundt, supra note 5, at 782-83
(deterrence enhanced because municipality directs employees to adhere to constitutional
standards and acts to diminish future violations); Newman, supra note 3, at 457 (municipal
liability provides incentive to monitor performance of police, insist on observance of
constitutional standards, and exercise internal discipline). See also K. DAvis, ADMINISrRA-
TIVE LAw T EATISE § 25.17, at 863-64 (Supp. 1970) (limits on effectiveness of loss dis-
tributing function of tort law as applied to public entities).
197. See p. 811 supra.
198. See G. CALABRESi, THE COSTs OF ACCIDENTS 21 (student ed. 1970) ("deep pocket" is
means of risk distribution that places losses on party best able to pay).
199. See Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 165 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded sub nom.
City of W. Haven v. Turpin, 47 U.S.L.W. 3360 (U.S. Nov. 28, 1978) (en banc) (munici-
pality well-suited to spread cost of compensating victims); Hundt, supra note 5, at 783
(Fourteenth Amendment rights are "public rights" to be supported by public). Judges
have expressed concern that the imposition of municipal liability will raid municipal
treasuries. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 724 (1978) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (leaves "limited treasuries" unprotected); Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152,
179 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded sub nom. City of W. Haven v. Turpin, 47 U.S.L.W.
3360 (U.S. Nov. 28, 1978) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting) (exposure to "incalculable
liability"). Judge Van Graafeiland termed it a "painful likelihood" that municipal
liability will "act as a catalyst in the exacerbation of social friction." Id. at 182. If
municipalities are not held liable, however, the social and economic burden of police
misconduct is borne by the uncompensated victims. The cost does not disappear merely
because recovery is not allowed.
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higher, jury awards should result.200 These awards would provide
greater incentive to municipalities to discipline their police officers
and to reduce future misconduct. The demonstrated disinclination of
municipalities to promulgate corrective policies can be changed only
if municipalities are forced to protect their own financial interests by
preventing the unconstitutional behavior of their employees.
Municipalities, however, should not be liable for punitive damages
awarded against individual officers.201 In those egregious cases that
prompt jurors to award punitive damages, justice requires that they be
paid solely by the individual officer at fault. In contrast to current
practice, municipalities should not be allowed to indemnify their of-
ficers for such awards.20 2 The possibility of personal financial loss may
help deter future misconduct.20 3
This Project has demonstrated the severe shortcomings of section
1983 suits when used as a remedy for police misconduct. It is hoped
that institution of the proposed changes will enable section 1983 to
provide a more effective means of redress. However, because the de-
ficiencies of police misconduct suits-jury bias, and an inability to in-
fluence police behavior-are so fundamental, it would be naive to
assume that relatively minor modifications will produce significant
results. These proposals constitute a first step toward affording an
adequate remedy for police misconduct. At best, their adoption may
stimulate other, more effective innovations.
200. See Newman, suPra note 3, at 456-57 (ignorant of indemnification, juries tend to
find for defendants or award modest damages); cf. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS 549 (4th ed. 1971) (juries tend to return more frequent or larger verdicts against
defendants with liability insurance).
201. Federal common law allows recovery of punitive damages in civil rights actions.
See, e.g., Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968)
(punitive damages allowed under § 1983 for outrageous invasion of privacy in illegal
search); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1965) (dicta recognizing possibility of
punitive damages under § 1983, new trial ordered).
202. See pp. 810-11 supra.
203. See G. CALABRSI, suPra note 198, at 269-70 (sometimes noninsurable penalty most
effective deterrent). One fear that has been raised concerning municipal liability is that
employees will become more inclined to commit unconstitutional acts if they are not
subject to personal liability. See Hundt, supra note 5, at 783.
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APPENDIX 1: ATTORNEY QUESTIONNAIRE
Questions Asked All Attorneys:
1. Name
2. Size of office: 1- 2-3- 4-9- 10 or more-
3. Years practicing law:
4. Please describe the type of practice that you have.
5. Have you ever been involved in a § 1983 suit other than the ones men-
tioned in our letter? How many? If yes, have you represented the
plaintiff/defendant in all these suits? If you have not always repre-
sented the plaintiff/defendant, how were you involved?
6. What factors are most important in determining the outcome of your
cases?
7. Do you settle these suits out of court more often or less often than
you do other claims against the municipality? Why?
8. What were the differences between the cases that you took to trial
and those you settled out of court?
9. Are most juries biased in favor of or against one side or the other in
§ 1983 suits? Do you think the biases are for, against, or both? (Which
side?) Why?
10. What effect does this bias have on your strategy during either negotia-
tion or trial?
11. Do you have a better chance for "success" with a bench trial or a
jury trial? Why?
12. Do judges treat these cases differently from other cases? Are judges
neutral in their handling of these suits? If not, which side do they
favor or oppose? How do they show their biases?
13. What, if any, procedural issues have a significant impact on the out-
come of the suit?
14. We have not read the depositions in these cases because they are not
part of the public record. Could you describe what information is
available in depositions that is not available through other means of
discovery?
15. Is the good faith defense important or unimportant in these suits?
Why?
16. Do you think the good faith defense affects the jury's verdict?
17. What do you think the jury understands the good faith defense to be?
18. How does the good faith defense affect your overall trial or negotiation
strategy?
19. Do you believe that § 1983 suits deter police misconduct? Why?
20. Do you know from personal experience of any changes in police prac-
tices because of § 1983 suits? What were they?
21. Do you believe that the level of police misconduct in Connecticut has
increased, decreased, or stayed the same since 1970? Why?
22. Why has the number of § 1983 police misconduct suits in this area in-
creased over the last ten years?
23. Have you ever appealed any § 1983 suits?
24. What types of cases do you appeal?
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25. Were any of your appeals carried through to appellate decisions? If
yes, what was the outcome? If no, why not? If you settled, what were
the settlements?
26. What statutory reforms of § 1983 and/or changes in its judicial in-
terpretation would you suggest? Why?
27. In order to understand fully these § 1983 misconduct suits, what did
we fail to ask that we should have asked?
Questions Asked Plaintiffs' Attorneys:
28. Have you been denied access to any documents that you felt were
essential to your case?
29. Have you ever brought a § 1983 suit in state court? Why, or why not?
30. What are the advantages and disadvantages of suing the police under
§ 1983 as opposed to a common law tort action?
31. Have you ever brought a common law tort claim against the police
other than a pendent claim?
32. How do you calculate the dollar amount to be sought for damages?
33. In your argument to the jury on damages, do you distinguish between
relief for the violations of the plaintiff's constitutional rights and his
other injuries and losses?
34. Given two plaintiffs, with similar physical injuries, would you rather
sue the owner of a store for his alleged negligence in causing the
plaintiff's injuries or would you rather sue a police officer who al-
legedly had intentionally injured the plaintiff? Why?
In the police case, would it make the plaintiff's claim more or less
valuable if he also suffered intangible losses?
35. Who do you think should be liable for the plaintiff's damages in
§ 1983 police misconduct cases?
36. Are insurance companies involved in these suits? How?
37. Are the plaintiffs involved during the preparation of § 198g cases?
How?
38. How did your clients find out about you?
39. Do you undertake these suits on a contingent fee basis? If not, what
type of compensation arrangement do you have?
40. Do you think the recent change in the civil rights statute, which
allows attorneys' fees to the successful party, will affect your handling
of these suits?
41. In comparison with your other legal work, are § 1983 suits of above
average, average, or below average remuneration?
42. What motivates you to bring these suits?
Questions Asked Defendants' Attorneys:
43. In these suits were you employed as Corporation Counsel, as a private
attorney paid by the municipality, as a private attorney paid by the
police officer or in another capacity?
44. What documents are the subject of most dispute during the discovery
process? Why?
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45. What would be the impact on these cases of giving the plaintiffs access
to reports of internal police department disciplinary investigations?
46. Are the defendants involved during preparation of these suits? Why?
47. Are insurance companies involved in these suits? Why?
48. Does the municipality always indemnify the individual defendants?
49. Is the municipality ever dismissed from the suit in exchange for its
agreement to pay any damages awarded to the plaintiff?
50. When the municipality indemnifies individual police officers, does
the municipality then put pressure on the police department to mini-
mize police misconduct and resultant § 1983 suits?
51. Do you perceive your role more as a defender of the individual police
officers or as a protector of the public treasury?
52. Do you think the recent change in the civil rights statutes, which
allows attorneys' fees to the successful party, will affect your handling
of these suits?
53. What percentage of these suits do you think are frivolous?
54. Do you characterize these cases as attorneys' cases or plaintiffs' cases?
APPENDIX 2: JUROR QUESTIONNAIRE
1. What was the outcome of the trial?
. A. The police officer won. B The plaintiff won.
C. Some plaintiffs won and some police officers won.
2. If money was awarded to the plaintiff, how much was awarded?
Plaintiff #1
If more than one plaintiff:
Plaintiff #2 Plaintiff #3
If you do not remember how much was awarded to each individual
plaintiff, what was the total amount of money awarded to the plain-
tiffs?
A. $ B. I do not remember.
3. Which of the following actions were any of the police officers accused
of?
- A. Shooting
.. B. Unlawful arrest
-_C. Unlawful search
_. D. Excessive force/police brutality
____E. Other (please specify)
4. What was your reaction to the plaintiff's attorney?




.. E. Strongly disliked
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If more than one attorney:
Attorney #2: -- A. _B. -C. _D. E.
Attorney #3: -- A. .. -C. ._D. E.
Attorney #4: -A. B. -C. -D. .E.






If more than one attorney:
Attorney #2: -A. _B. -C. .. D. .. E.
Attorney #3: -- A. B. -C..._D. E.
Attorney #4: -A. -B. .C. _.D..E.
6. Did the plaintiff's lifestyle affect your verdict?
... A. Yes-it greatly affected my verdict.
:B. Yes-it affected my verdict some.
-C. No-it did not affect my verdict.
If yes, in what way was your verdict affected?
A. In favor of the plaintiff
... B. Against the plaintiff
If yes, please write in the space below what it was about the plaintiff's
lifestyle that affected your verdict.
7. Did the plaintiff have a criminal record?
A. Yes
B. No
__C. I was never told.
D. I do not remember.
If yes, how did the plaintiff's criminal record affect your verdict?
A. Strongly against the plaintiff
... B. Against the plaintiff
___G. No effect
8. Did the fact that the defendant was a police officer affect your verdict?
--- _A. Yes-it greatly affected my verdict.
.. B. Yes-it affected my verdict some.
-. C. No-it did not affect my verdict.
If yes, in what way was your verdict affected?
A. In favor of the police officer
... B. Against the police officer
9. Did the police officer think his actions were reasonable?
- A. Yes -B. No
Regardless of what the police officer thought, did you think his actions
were reasonable?
- A. Yes . No
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10. People sometimes feel that a plaintiff's rights were violated but that
other persons, in addition to a police officer, should have been sued.
Did you feel this way about this trial?
A Yes .B. No
If yes, who else should have been sued?
- A. City
. B. Superior officers
-. C. Other police officers
. Other (please specify)
If yes, please write in the space below the reason why you thought that
someone else should have been sued.
11. Did the judge properly conduct the trial?
--- A. Yes .B No
If no, please write in the space below what he did that was improper.
12. Did the police officer's ability to pay any money awarded to the plain-
tiff affect your verdict?
A. Yes . No
If yes, how did it affect your verdict?
- A. I found the police officer not liable.
B. I awarded more money than I would have otherwise.
-. C. I awarded less money than I would have otherwise.
13. There is a doctrine, sometimes called the good faith defense, which
says that if a police officer believed, in good faith, that his conduct
was lawful and if his belief was reasonable, then he is not liable for
his actions.
(a) Was this doctrine mentioned by the judge?
.. A. Yes (If yes, please go to question #13 b.)
B. No (If no, please go to question #14.)
-C. I do not remember. (If you do not remember, please
go to question #14.)
(b) Did you feel that this doctrine was adequately explained by the
judge?
- A. Yes B. No
(c) Did this doctrine affect your verdict?
_____-A. Yes (If yes, please go to question #13 d.)
.. B. No (If no, please go to question #14.)
(d) How did this doctrine affect your verdict?
---- A. Strongly in favor of the police officer
.. B. In favor of the police officer
_ C. Against the police officer
-D. Strongly against the police officer
(e) Please write in the space below the reason why the doctrine af-
fected your verdict this way.
14. Did you think that a verdict against the police officer would affect the
police department's ability to control crime?
_A. Yes . B. No
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If yes, the police department's job would be made




15. Did you think that a verdict against the police officer would serve as a
warning to other police officers not to do similar acts in the future?
-- A. Yes .B No
If yes, did you think such a result was desirable?
-- A. Yes .B. No
16. Did you think that the police officer would not have to pay any
money awarded to the plaintiff because someone else would pay the
money for him?
--- A. Yes -B No
If yes, who did you think would pay the money for him?
A. An insurance company
B. The city
____C. Superior officers
... D. Other (please specify)
17. If you awarded damages to the plaintiff, please describe in the space
below the losses and injuries for which you gave the plaintiff money.
18. Was reaching your verdict easy or difficult?
____A. Easy B. Difficult
Please write in the space below the reason why it was easy or difficult.







20. What is your sex?
A. Male LB Female
21. What was your educational level at the time of the trial?
A. High school not completed





22. If you would like to add anything or explain your answers, we en-
courage you to do so in the space below.
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